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ABSTRACT 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MOOD AND IMPLICIT LEARNING 
By 
Kathleen G. Larson 
Dr. David E. Copeland, Examination Committee Chair 
Associate Professor of Psychology 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas 
 
This dissertation investigates whether a person’s current mood state influences their ability to 
learn implicitly. Implicit learning refers to learning about regularities in the environment without 
having conscious access to the information (e.g., Reber, 1967). According to the affect-as-
information hypothesis, a positive mood increases global processing of incoming information 
and negative mood leads to local processing (e.g., Clore & Storbeck, 2006); however, most 
previous studies that investigated mood and cognition have focused on more explicit types of 
learning and decision making, but few have examined implicit processes. Thus, the current 
experiments examined how varying levels of mood and arousal affect artificial grammar 
learning. A pilot experiment demonstrated an advantage for positive mood when the images were 
mood inducing. Experiment 1 had a separate mood induction phase and participants completed 
an artificial grammar task that contained letters. These results replicated an earlier study by Pretz 
et al. (2010) that showed an advantage for those in a negative mood. Experiment 2 was an 
expansion of the pilot by including standardized images and two additional mood groups 
(positive-high arousal and neutral). However, there were no significant differences between 
mood conditions. Experiment 3 used categories of pictures and found a disadvantage for those in 
a positive / high aroused state. While the patterns across the experiments were slightly different, 
altogether, the results were not consistent with the predictions made by the affect-as-information 
hypothesis. As addressed in the dissertation, this could be due to certain elements of the artificial 
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grammar learning procedure, such as the long viewing phase diminishing the mood and arousal 
induction effects. The dissertation also considers other possibilities, including the idea that 
implicit learning is not as affected by mood as explicit learning.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 There are many skills that people learn that they cannot always verbalize. For example, 
imagine a pair of police detectives were assigned to monitor the activities of a potential criminal. 
The detectives may learn the daily routines of the adversary after countless hours of surveillance. 
They may not be able to explicitly describe all of the suspect’s patterns of behaviors, but they 
would likely notice if there is an anomaly. This dissertation explored implicit learning, where 
people pick up on consistent patterns without necessarily being able to describe them. In 
addition, this dissertation also considered how mood interacts with this process. One possibility 
is that a good mood will boost the ability to detect regularities due to broadening of attention that 
is known to accompany a positive mood (e.g., Schwarz & Clore, 2007). Another possibility is 
that a negative mood will increase the ability to detect anomalies due to narrowing the focus of 
attention (e.g., Schwarz & Clore, 2007). I will begin by discussing the construct of implicit 
learning, the techniques used to study it, and some of the main findings in the literature. I will 
then discuss mood and how it affects cognitive processes, followed by the small number of 
studies that have examined the influence of mood on implicit learning.  
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CHAPTER 2 
REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE 
Implicit Learning 
Overview of Implicit Learning 
 Implicit learning occurs when people automatically learn information about the relations 
of events or objects without intending to do so, and the knowledge is difficult to express 
(Cleeremans, Destrebecquz, & Boyer, 1998). The procedure typically involves incidental 
exposure to rule governed stimuli (unbeknownst to the participant), a test to measure what 
participants learned, and a measure of how conscious the knowledge is that was acquired (e.g., 
Reber, 1967). Learning is referred to as implicit because even though people are not actively 
trying to encode the information for later retrieval, there is evidence that information was 
remembered to some degree; for example, in these tasks, participants usually score above chance 
on the test despite having little confidence in their performance.  
 The term implicit learning was first dubbed by Reber (1967) in his seminal study. Reber 
thought that traditional learning tasks employed in a laboratory setting did not mimic how 
children learn their native language. He examined language acquisition by testing adults with an 
artificial grammar that they had never been exposed to before. The grammar was generated by a 
finite-state grammar (Chomsky & Miller, 1958). This is a process where transitions from one 
state to another state produces a letter and is typically illustrated with a state diagram (see Figure 
1). In these early experiments, grammatical strings (consisting of 3-8 letters) were presented on 
notecards during the learning phase. Importantly, participants were not told that the strings 
consisted of any pattern; they were simply told that the experiment was investigating memory. 
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After learning, the participants were then informed that the strings of letters were derived from a 
‘rigorous’ set of rules. They then had to complete an unexpected yes / no recognition test where 
they decided whether the strings presented during test were grammatical. The results showed that 
people were able to classify the strings significantly above chance, meaning that participants 
were learning at least some of the rules underlying the grammar, despite not being able to state 
the rules in post-experimental questioning. This method has been employed in several 
experiments since (for reviews see Pothos, 2007; Reber, 1989; Shanks & St. John, 1994) and it 
now referred to as the Artificial Grammar Learning (AGL) paradigm (Reber, 1967). 
 Interestingly, in the late 1990’s developmental researchers coined the term statistical 
learning to account for a very similar phenomenon. Saffran, Aslin, and Newport (1996) had 8-
month old infants listen to an artificial language where there were no pauses between words but 
the syllables occurred in specific temporal orders. For example, infants were presented with an 
audio stream such as “bidakupadotigolabubidaku” and based on the consistently repeating 
patterns, bidaku would be considered a “word” (note: the stimuli were audio - underlining was 
used here to emphasize that particular pattern for the reader). The infants listened to the language 
for two minutes. Then they were tested with words (e.g., bidaku) and part words (e.g., bupado); 
the infants looked longer at the novel words (i.e., part words), indicating that they had learned 
the grouping of syllables that was presented during the listening phase. The results were coined 
as statistical learning because learners could “compute” a statistic of how often the syllables 
occurred in relation to each other.  
 Statistical learning has been referred to as a type of implicit learning because learners are 
usually not conscious of the pattern (e.g., Aslin & Newport, 2012). There are several similarities 
between the statistical learning procedure and the artificial grammar paradigm. For instance, they 
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both require incidental learning of structured material that is followed by a test. However, there 
are some notable differences; specifically, for statistical learning: (1) participants are given a 
cover task (e.g., responding when there is a duplicate stimulus), (2) the stimuli are presented to 
them in one continuous stream, and (3) the recognition task is forced-choice (instead of yes / no). 
Despite statistical learning paradigms and artificial grammar paradigms originating from 
different traditions, there are now several cross-references between the two domains (see 
Perruchet & Pacton, 2006, for a review) and some use the term implicit statistical learning to 
refer to both domains (e.g., Conway & Christiansen, 2006).  
Other Paradigms 
 Although the artificial grammar paradigm and the procedures used to examine statistical 
learning dominate the literature, there are two other paradigms worth mentioning. Sequence 
learning is a type of implicit learning that is typically measured with a Serial Reaction Time 
(SRT) task, where participants press a key when they see a stimulus appear in various places on 
the computer screen (e.g., Nissen & Bullemer, 1987). For example, the screen could be divided 
into a quadrant and the participant presses one of the four corresponding keys each time that a 
star appears. The participants are not aware that the presentation of stimuli is following a pattern, 
but because of the pattern, they end up making faster responses than participants who are 
assigned random sequences. Therefore, participants are able to predict the next event based on 
past events. The underlying pattern is usually generated from a finite-state grammar like those 
used in the artificial grammar paradigm. An advantage of the Serial Reaction Time task over 
other techniques is that there is no separation between the study phase and the test phase, 
presumably making it more like implicit learning in the real world.  
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 Dynamic System Control is used less frequently than the other paradigms and began in 
the problem-solving domain. In Dynamic System Control tasks, participants are trained to 
control the computer simulation of an interactive system, such as a sugar factory (Berry & 
Broadbent, 1984). The participants are given certain output variables, such as the amount that the 
sugar factory produces, and have to manipulate certain inputs, such as the number of workers in 
the sugar factory. They are given a specific goal (e.g., amount of sugar) to reach and maintain. 
This task is considered implicit because participants can typically reach the goal level of control, 
even though they cannot explicitly state the rules of the system when asked about them in a post-
experiment questionnaire. Furthermore, making participants aware of the underlying rules 
improves their ability to answer questions about the system but not their ability to control it 
(Berry & Broadbent, 1984). 
Implicit Learning and Decisions in Everyday Life 
 Implicit learning is important to study because it is believed to be the foundation of 
intuitive decision making (Patterson et al, 2013). There are two types of decision processes that 
drive the decisions that people make: (a) analytic decision making and (b) intuitive decision 
making (Evans, 2008). Analytic decision making is when people make decisions in a slow and 
deliberate manner. For example, when someone puts a considerable amount of effort into 
deciding where they are going to attend graduate school, they may spend a great deal of time 
explicitly weighing the pros and cons of different choices. In contrast, intuitive decision making 
occurs when people make decisions in an automatic and procedural fashion. For example, a 
person’s morning routine and grocery shopping involve processes that are highly automatic and 
typically do not involve much conscious thought. Intuitive decisions are made more than analytic 
decisions in order to function in everyday life.  
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 There is often an advantage to using intuitive decision making over analytic. For 
example, Crandall and Getchell-Reiter (1993) studied neonatal nurses and discovered that the 
experienced nurses could determine whether the infants had a life threatening infection before 
the blood test confirmed it. However, the nurses often had difficultly verbalizing how they 
reached their conclusions. Similarly, physicians with a high level of knowledge can use their 
intuitions and make better decisions than less knowledgeable physicians (Reyna & Lloyd, 2006). 
Hammond, Hamm, Grassia, and Pearson (1987) found that highway engineers perform better 
when they use a non-analytical approach. These findings of better outcomes for intuitive 
decisions have been replicated in several fields, from the military to expert chess players (see 
Klein, 1998, for a review).   
 The studies above support the idea that experts can use unconscious pattern recognition 
to help them make quick decisions This theory has been referred to as the Recognition Primed 
Decision model and posits that people make decisions, often not at a conscious level, that are 
based on cues in their environment that are similar to past experiences (Klein, 1997, 1998, 2008). 
In other words, prototypical events get stored in long term memory and the expert is able to 
quickly determine if the details of the current event match past events. Therefore, intuitive 
decision making is believed to rely on tactical knowledge that is stored in procedural memory 
and therefore harder to articulate (Klein, 1998). For example, a firefighter draws on past 
experiences to make assessments about how dangerous the fire is based on cues like heat and 
height of flame. Research suggests that eighty percent of the time, experts make intuitive 
decisions instead of analytic decisions. Experts are also more likely to spend a greater amount of 
time analyzing the situation as opposed to deciding a course of action compared to novices 
(Kobus, Proctor, Bank, & Holste, 2000).  
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 It is important to note that not all experts can make decisions based on regularities 
because not all professions operate in a predictable environment. For example, stock brokers, 
clinical psychologists, and college admissions officers have less regularity in their jobs than 
firefighters, accountants, and livestock judges (Shantea, 1992). A profession like firefighting 
operates in an environment that has been termed “high validity” (Kahneman & Klein, 2009) 
because there are salient cues followed by stable events. In contrast, in a “low validity” 
environment, decisions are not as practiced and people often never receive feedback about their 
outcomes.  
 Due to human error in low validity environments, some have argued that statistical 
prediction (also termed mechanical judgments) derived from algorithms is superior to human 
decision making (Grove, Zald, Lebow, Snitz, & Nelson, 2000). However, as Kahneman and 
Klein (2009) pointed out in their review, mechanical judgments are superior to human judgments 
only in cases where validity is either low (so it is difficult to detect regularities) or very high 
(when humans are likely to have attentional lapses in judgments). In the former case, a statistical 
approach is more effective because it maintains consistency even when the cues are weak 
(Karelaia & Hogarth, 2008) because humans are more likely to find idiosyncratic relationships 
between variables (e.g., when predicting future stock values).  
 To summarize, implicit learning is an important process to study because it builds the 
foundation for intuitive decision making. In that, the regularities in a person’s environment that 
are acquired through implicit processes give people a template to compare to similar situations. 
Intuitive decision making is utilized in the real world more than analytic decision making. 
Experts in predictable environments rely on non-salient cues to make decisions but other factors 
can also influence how people make decisions. 
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Stimuli Without Words 
 A large number of implicit learning studies have used word stimuli, either presented 
visually or aurally, to better understand language acquisition. However, the use of non-word 
stimuli can demonstrate how we learn about other regularities in our world, outside of language. 
For example, both the artificial grammar paradigm and the statistical learning paradigm have 
been altered by replacing the “letters” in the grammar with tones (e.g., Saffran, Johnson, Aslin & 
Newport, 1999), images (e.g., Otsuka, Nishiyaman, Nakahara, & Kawaguchi, 2013), and even 
vibrations (e.g., Conway and Christiansen, 2005). I will quickly review some of the research 
conducted in non-visual sensory modalities, but then focus on the studies that have used visual 
stimuli as the current investigation will use images.  
 Saffran et al. (1999) presented participants with nonlinguistic materials in a statistical 
learning paradigm. Specifically, letters were replaced with tones, such as G#DB. Adults who 
were non-musicians first listened to the tonal auditory streams and then made discriminations 
between tone ‘words’ and tone ‘part- words’ (e.g., ADB). The participants were able to 
successful make the discriminations, and remarkably, so were 8-month infants in a subsequent 
study. This finding demonstrated that people can implicitly learn non-linguistic auditory 
information at a relatively low level but other studies have found that people can implicitly learn 
more complex auditory information such as rhythm (e.g., Selchenkova, Jones, & Tillmann, 
2014).  
Conway and Christiansen (2005) investigated if people could demonstrate tactile implicit 
learning and whether performance was comparable to other modalities. They presented vibration 
on participants’ fingertips in an artificial grammar sequence where each letter from the grammar 
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was mapped to a specific finger. Participants were able to learn the underlying structure of the 
vibrations, although consistent with other findings reported earlier, they were not able to 
verbalize the patterns. However, when the same stimulus set was compared to the auditory and 
visual domains, stimuli presented tactically produced comparable performance to stimuli 
presented visually, though aurally presented stimuli produced the best performance.  
  In the visual modality, implicit learning has been explored with an immersive real world 
environment. Patterson and colleagues (2009, 2013) examined the implicit learning of vehicles 
(e.g., cargo truck) in a simulated point-of-view that an Air Force pilot might encounter. The 
sequences of vehicles followed a finite state grammar and participants were either told to 
memorize or view the vehicles’ sequences. Participants were able to learn the underlying 
grammar and the performance was comparable regardless of the instruction condition. However, 
when the researchers investigated participants’ ability to transfer to other mediums, they found 
that people could transfer the knowledge of sequences from a simulated environment to a flat 
screen display but not the other way around. This shows that implicit learning can occur in a 
simulated real world environment and that there might be some slight differences between 
learning in a virtual environment compared to a static one.  
Fiser and Aslin (2002) presented participants with an animation of changing shapes 
utilizing a statistical learning paradigm. One shape was presented at a time from behind a vertical 
cylinder. Participants were able to learn the underlying pattern as evident by 95% performance 
on a forced-choice recognition test and in a subsequent study they were able to also learn the 
conditional probabilities (e.g., that the triangle follows the star given that the square appeared). 
Learning the conditional probability improved with longer exposure suggesting that simpler 
statistics or pattern recognition are learned first. 
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In a study that is particularly relevant to the current investigation, Brady and Oliva (2008) 
examined whether people could learn implicitly at a conceptual level. Utilizing a statistical 
learning paradigm, they presented images of various complex scenes (e.g., bathroom, bridge, and 
bedroom) grouped together in triplets. Participants were very accurate on the recognition test and 
were able to overcome how scenes were grouped together in the real world (e.g., of those three, 
bathroom and bedroom are usually close in proximity in the real world). In a subsequent 
experiment, they used a different picture from the same category each time it was presented (e.g., 
covered bridge, Golden Gate bridge, etc.) and found that participants were fairly accurate, 
although not as accurate as when the same pictures were used. They then took it one step further 
and tested with only words because many of the pictures from the same category had similar 
perceptual features (e.g., pictures of bridges always included water). The participants performed 
at the same level of accuracy with the words as they did with the different pictures. The results 
from these experiments demonstrate that people can learn implicitly with natural scenes and that 
they are not just learning their low level features, but they are also processing the scenes at a 
higher conceptual level.  
Implicit Learning Theories 
 Early implicit learning studies attributed implicit learning to the acquired abstract mental 
representations of the underlying structure of the material (e.g., Reber, 1967). This was based on 
the idea that knowledge in the artificial grammar task is derived from a separate, tacit system, 
which is why participants are often not conscious of their learning. Studies demonstrating 
transfer when different letters were used between training and test (Altmann, Dienes, & Goode, 
1995; Mathews et al., 1989; Reber, 1969) were provided as evidence for tacit learning. 
Moreover, some have suggested that the information acquired through implicit learning is 
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consolidated in procedural memory (Patterson et al., 2013). The main evidence for this claim 
comes from a study where amnesic patients were able to learn pattern-analyzing skills despite 
showing no explicit memory for the stimuli or task (Cohen & Squire, 1980). Additionally, 
making participants aware of the rules before the presentation of the letter strings makes them 
perform worse (Reber & Allen, 1978), suggesting that an unconscious encoding might be 
required.  
 Several researchers have suggested that participants in artificial grammar experiments do 
not memorize rules but make decisions during the recognition test based on what has been 
referred to as ‘exemplars’ that were memorized during the presentation phase (Brooks & Vokey, 
1991; Medin & Smith, 1981; Posner & Keele, 1968). Exemplars are derived from experiences 
that get stored in episodic memory as a template or schema and form the basis for category 
learning (Redher & Hastie, 2004). In artificial grammar paradigms, exemplars are compared to 
items presented on a test based on overall resemblance or similarity. In other words, people are 
drawing analogies between test items and exemplars that were remembered during training.  
 A more extreme alternative to the abstract explanation was developed by Perruchet and 
Pacteau (1990) who showed that the knowledge acquired in both artificial grammar learning and 
statistical learning tasks might consist of little more than explicitly memorized short fragments 
such as bigrams (i.e., two letter fragments) or trigrams (i.e., three letter fragments). Then people 
decide whether the grammar string presented during test is grammatical or not depending on 
whether it contains one of the memorized chunks. For example, a participant could recognize 
that the bigram TP occurs frequently and make the decision during testing that TPPTS is 
grammatical because it contains that memorized chunk. This explanation derives from the 
finding that participants who only studied bigrams performed at the same level as participants 
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who saw the complete letter strings (Dulaney, Carlson, & Dewey, 1984; Perruchet & Pacteau, 
1990). Support for this model also comes from studies showing that grammatical test items high 
in ‘chunk strength’ (i.e., comprised of common bigram and trigrams) are more likely to be 
classified as grammatical (Knowlton & Squire, 1994).  
 An even more extreme theory reduces artificial grammar learning to mere exposure. The 
mere exposure effect (Zajonc, 1968) is based on the finding that people develop a preference for 
stimuli that they find more familiar to them. One artificial grammar study (Gordon & Holyoak, 
1983) replaced the standard yes / no grammar test with a ‘liking’ test where participants rated 
how much they liked letter strings, and, surprisingly, performance was comparable to the 
standard test. Another study (Buchner, 1994) examined fluency, a similar psychological 
construct, where repeated stimuli are processed more quickly than novel stimuli. It was found 
that while people could identify grammatical strings more quickly in a perceptual clarification 
task, performance on that task did not predict grammatically judgments later in the yes / no 
recognition test. Furthermore, as mentioned previously, transfer can occur in artificial grammar 
learning suggesting that implicit learning is not bounded by the superficial features. Therefore, 
few researchers endorse the mere exposure effect as an adequate explanation of implicit learning.  
 Overall, researchers have not been in agreement with regards to the mechanism driving 
implicit learning. It could be based on a separate tacit system, a form of category learning, or 
based on purely memorized chunks. However, this has not been debated in the literature recently 
and some have suggested a hybrid explanation whereby a general tacit system and a more 
explicit system based on memorized details is required to be successful at implicit learning (e.g., 
Cleeremans, Destrebecqz, & Boyer, 2001; Meulemans & Van Der Linden, 1997).  
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Is Attention Needed for Implicit Learning?  
On the surface, it would appear that not much attention is required to learn in an implicit 
learning task, considering that participants are typically not instructed to pay attention and often 
do not realize that they are learning anything. For example, Saffran, Newport, Aslin, Tunick, and 
Barrueco (1997) found that both children and adults demonstrated implicit learning with a 
statistical learning paradigm for auditory streams that were played in the background while they 
were performing an unrelated coloring task. Conway and Christiansen (2006) also used a 
statistical learning paradigm and found that people could learn two different sequences 
simultaneously if they were presented in two different modalities and performance was 
comparable to those that only learned one sequence. These studies have led some researchers to 
believe that implicit learning occurs automatically from mere exposure, thus, requiring little 
attention (Fiser & Aslin, 2002; Saffran et al., 1999).  
 However, several studies suggest the opposite; namely, that attention is required in 
implicit learning because a secondary task impairs performance compared to a single task when 
using an artificial grammar or serial reaction time paradigm (Cohen, Ivry, & Keele, 1990; 
Frensch, Buchner, & Lin, 1994). For instance, Patterson et al. (2013) found that accuracy suffers 
when people perform an implicit learning task while simultaneously engaging in articulatory 
suppression. The discrepancy between the Saffran et al. (1997) study and other studies possibly 
derives from the differences in the paradigms. Specifically, the statistical learning paradigm 
requires less attention due to presenting a less complex underlying pattern compared to the 
artificial grammar and serial reaction time paradigms. Therefore, it appears that attention helps 
people learn information better in an implicit learning task, but full attention may not be 
required.  
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 Turke-Brown, Junge, and Scholl (2005) investigated this issue further by exploring 
whether attention was selective during implicit learning. Employing a statistical learning 
paradigm, participants were presented with green and red shapes, and told to only attend to one 
of the colors (e.g., “target” and “ignored” shapes). During a later test when the shapes were 
presented in black, people demonstrated implicit learning for the “target” shapes, but not the 
ones that had been presented earlier in the ignored color. The same pattern of results was found 
when the test included the colors that were used during the familiarization phase and when the 
colors were swapped (i.e., the green shapes presented during familiarization were red during the 
test). However, when the experimenters measured response times of target detection, participants 
were able to detect “target” and “ignored” shapes equally well. The results of these experiments 
suggest that implicit learning is automatic, but that people are able to direct their attention to 
particular aspects of the stimuli to improve learning. 
 In a later study, Turk-Browne, Isola, Scholl, and Treat (2008) were interested in whether 
people attend to the objects (e.g., shapes), features (e.g., color), or both during a task. Over a set 
of experiments, the researchers discovered that visual statistical learning can be both object-
based and feature-based. When the shapes were presented in the same color during the 
familiarization phase, people showed better performance for objects. However, people did not 
show evidence of implicit learning when presented with uniquely colored shapes and then tested 
separately with either color patches or colorless shapes. These results indicate that implicit 
learning in the visual domain is more object-based but that people can still rely on features as 
another cue to identify the object. 
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Neural Correlates of Implicit Learning 
 Even though the experiments conducted and reported for this dissertation do not include 
neurological measurements, an understanding of what has been learned from studies that have 
focused on the brain can be helpful. Several studies have shown that amnesic patients with 
damage to the medial temporal lobe (which includes the hippocampus) show normal 
performance on an artificial grammar task (Knowlton et al., 1992; Knowlton & Squire, 1994, 
1996). However, those patients are only able to perform the same as normal participants when 
instructed to make grammatical judgments and not when told to make judgments based on the 
training phase. The difference is thought to be due to the latter depending more on explicit 
memory processes (which are impaired for the patients due to the temporal / hippocampus 
damage).  
 Additionally, several studies have shown that patients with Huntington’s and Parkinson’s 
disease demonstrate normal artificial grammar learning (Knowlton et al., 1996; Reber & Squire, 
1999; Witt, Nuhsman, & Deuschl, 2002). In Huntington’s disease, patients have damage to the 
basal ganglia (an area believed to be involved with action selection) and with Parkinson’s 
disease, patients have damage to the substantia nigra (an area that produces dopamine). 
However, they do show impaired performance in the serial reaction time task, as well as other 
motor-related tasks (Knopman & Nissen, 1991; Siegert, Taylor, Weatherall, & Abernethy, 2006; 
Willingham & Koroshetz, 1993). The findings from these studies suggest that serial reaction 
time and artificial grammar learning may rely on different underlying mechanisms and these 
findings align with other studies that have found performance differences (e.g., Destrebecqz & 
Cleeremans, 2001).  
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Brain imagining studies have revealed that a large number of brain circuits are involved 
in implicit learning depending on the task. For instance, despite patients with Huntington’s and 
Parkinson’s performing normally on artificial grammar tasks, studies with normal participants 
have shown activation in the basal ganglia (Forkstam et al., 2006; Lieberman, Chang, Chiao, 
Bookheimer, & Knowlton, 2004). The prefrontal cortex areas, such as the left inferior gyrus and 
Broca’s area, are involved in both the learning and testing phases in the artificial grammar 
paradigm (Opitz & Friederici, 2004; Petersson, Folia, & Hagoort, 2012; Skosnik et al., 2002). 
Interestingly, similar regions are also involved in language processing (e.g., Karuza et al., 2013).  
The way that implicit learning relies on the basal ganglia is complex, in part because the 
basal ganglia is a multi-component system consisting of the striatum, caudate, and putamen 
(Nolte & Angevine, 1995). The basal ganglia are important for motor functions (e.g., eye 
movements; Hikosaka, Takikawa, & Kawagoe, 2000) and are connected to the motor cortex and 
premotor cortex (Alexander, DeLong, & Strick, 1986). However, they are also connected to the 
prefrontal cortex (Middleton & Strick, 1994), making it important for cognitive functions as 
well. There are several ways that these systems can interact in implicit tasks with learning taking 
place in either the basal ganglia (Pasupathy & Miller, 2005) or the prefrontal cortex first (Fuster, 
2001).   
Overall, the neurological underpinnings that underlie implicit learning are complex. The 
hippocampus is generally associated with explicit long term memory but does not appear to play 
a role in implicit learning, as evident by amnesiacs’ normal performance (e.g., Knowlton and 
Squire, 1994). The basal ganglia appear to be an important set of structures for implicit learning 
(e.g., Forkstam et al., 2006), but reliance on them is not absolutely necessary as those who have 
damage to their basal ganglia (e.g., those with Parkinson’s and Huntington’s disease) still 
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perform normally on artificial grammar tasks, probably due to the recruitment of another brain 
structure such as the prefrontal cortex (Fuster, 2001). 
Individual Differences and Implicit Learning 
 In cognitive psychology, it is common to explore individual differences in cognitive 
processes; however, the cognitive processes that are examined are usually more explicit. For 
example, individual differences in an explicit task like a working memory span test are related to 
performance on other explicit cognitive tasks, such as IQ, problem solving, and comprehension 
(Conway, Cowan, Bunting, Therriault, & Minkoff, 2002; Engle, 2002). In contrast, numerous 
studies have found modest to no correlations between implicit learning and individual 
differences in cognitive abilities such as working memory, intelligence, and intentional associate 
learning (Gebauer & MacKintosh, 2007; Kaufman et al., 2009; McGeorge, Crawford, & Kelly, 
1997; Reber, 1993; Reber, Walken, & Hernstadt, 1991). Some researchers have posited that the 
lack of individual differences stem from implicit learning being more of an evolutionarily older 
ability and thus should be more resistant to individual differences (Reber, 1993). However, 
others have gone as far to say that implicit learning tasks are more dependent on automatic 
association processes rather than cognitive abilities (e.g., Mackintosh, 1998), which is in line 
with many dual process theories that are considered today (Chaiken & Trope, 1999; Epstein, 
Pacin, Denes-Raj, & Haier, 1996; Evans, 2003,2008; Evans & Stanovich, 2013). 
 Despite the lack of correlations between implicit learning task performance and 
traditional individual difference variables in cognition (e.g., working memory, IQ, etc.), 
relationships have been observed when using nontraditional variables. Specifically, Kaufman et 
al. (2010) found that verbal analogical reasoning and foreign language performance 
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independently predicted performance on a serial reaction time task in adolescents. This finding 
suggests that implicit learning ability might contribute to specific language acquisition skills and 
is consistent with findings in the statistical learning literature which have found that higher 
performance on statistical learning tasks in children is related to learning the syntax of language 
(Kidd, 2012), reading ability (Arcului & Simpson, 2012), and vocabulary growth (Evans et al., 
2009).   
 It also appears that implicit learning proficiency may be related to certain facets of 
personality. One study found that individuals who were categorized as intuitive types on the 
Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (Jung, 1971) were better than sensing types at the implicit learning 
task of judging applicant personality profiles (Woolhouse & Bayne, 2000). The intuitive types 
also reported using more intuitive strategies than the sensing types. The researchers suggested 
that perhaps the intuitive types let feelings of familiarity guide their decisions. Kaufman et al. 
(2010) also found a relationship between intuitive personality type and implicit learning with a 
serial reaction time task. Additionally, performance on the serial reaction time task was also 
correlated with the Openness aspect of the Big Five Aspect Scales (DeYoung, Quilty, & Peterson 
2007). Other researchers have also argued that intuition and implicit learning are related 
constructs with subjective feelings getting acquired through implicit learning experiences 
(Dienes, 2008; Lieberman, 2000; Reber, 1989). 
 Individual differences arising from differences in culture background have also been 
examined. It is well known that Westerners are more focused on individual elements and Asians 
focus more on global aspects or the ‘big picture’ (e.g., Nisbett, 2003). Kiyokawa, Dienes, 
Tanaka, Yamada, and Crowe (2012) presented grammatical strings consisting of large letters that 
was made of a smaller, different letter (e.g., a large N made up of smaller B’s) to Japanese 
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(Asian) and United Kingdom (Western) participants. The researchers found that the Japanese 
learned only at the global level but the United Kingdom participants learned equally well at both 
levels. In a subsequent experiment, when participants were instructed to attend to the global or 
local level, the participants from both cultures performed equally.  
 Overall, it appears that implicit learning is related to other psychological processes that 
are relatively implicit, especially those that are related to language learning (e.g., Kaufman et al., 
2010). However, being both open to experiences and more likely to rely on feelings of intuition 
are also related to better performance on implicit learning tasks (e.g., Woolhouse & Bayne, 
2000). These findings suggest that occupation selection in terms of personality tests and 
language learning proficiency may be a useful tool to judge who is going to perform well at tasks 
involving implicit processes. A person’s mood might also influence implicit learning. The next 
section will discuss how a person’s current emotional state or mood influences how they make 
decisions, perceive the world, and what they encode in their memory. 
Mood 
Overview of Mood 
 When using the term mood, it is important to note that there are several different, related 
terms that can be used and have been used by researchers to describe this phenomenon. Affect is 
the term used to refer to the representation of general valence that one experiences and it can be 
positive or negative. The representation can be cognitive, physiological, and behavioral, among 
others (Clore & Huntsinger, 2007). Mood is a similar term that refers to a diffuse affective state. 
In contrast, emotions are usually seen as related to the appraisal of a single object or stimulus, 
shorter in duration, and can be reflected differently depending on the type of emotion being 
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expressed (Clore & Huntsinger, 2007; Eldar, Rutledge, Dolan, & Niv, 2015). While some 
researchers have used the term affect (e.g., Isen, 2002), and others have used mood (e.g., Gasper 
& Clore, 2002), the terms appear to be relatively synonymous and used interchangeably in the 
literature.  
 There are several ways that mood can be induced in a laboratory setting. For example, 
mood state can be manipulated by having participants watch films, recall memories, view 
pictures, or listen to music. Additionally, the mood manipulation procedure can be considered 
incidental, referring to when the mood state is not related to the cognitive task. It can also be 
integral, referring to when the mood state is induced by the cognitive task (e.g., making 
judgments about car accident pictures). To my knowledge, there are only a handful of studies 
comparing the different mood induction procedures (Albersnagel, 1988; Martin, 1990; 
Westermann, Spies, Stahl, & Hales, 1996). A meta-analysis that examined 11 of the mood 
induction procedures found larger effect sizes for film and story (Westermann et al., 1996). The 
effects are also larger when participants are explicitly told to enter a mood state, indicating that 
participants are possibly succumbing to demand characteristics (Westermann et al., 1996). 
 When researchers ask participants to self-report mood, the most widely used mood 
measure is the Positive And Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS) which consists of 10 positive 
mood words (e.g., excited) and 10 negative mood words (e.g., distressed) that participants rate on 
a five point Likert scale (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). It was derived from Zevon and 
Tellegen’s (1982) larger mood checklist and has been found to be reliable, valid, and not 
influenced by demographic variables (Crawford & Henry, 2004). It is typically administered 
before and after the mood induction procedure to see if the induction impacted their baseline 
mood state. Because certain cognitive effects, especially in decision making, are reduced if 
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participants are aware of the mood manipulation (e.g., Schawrz & Clore, 1983), briefer versions 
of the PANAS were explored. For example, a short form of the measure (I-PANAS-SF) was 
developed a few years ago and consists of only 5 positive and 5 negative words (Thompson, 
2007). The shorter version was found to be a reliable and valid research tool that does not take as 
long to administer as the traditional PANAS. 
Mood and Cognition  
 An important reason for discussing the effects of mood is that research has shown that the 
mood an individual is experiencing can influence how they learn and process information and 
this has been termed the affect-as-information hypothesis (Clore & Storbeck, 2006; Schwarz & 
Clore, 1983, 2007). Specifically, a positive mood is believed to elicit relational processing and 
involves processing incoming information in relation to concepts in memory and drawing 
connections between those related concepts (Fiedler, 2001; Hunt & McDaniel, 1993). To put it 
simply, a positive mood encourages a broadening of attention and cognitive resources, leading 
people to focus on the big picture rather than the details. As a result, a positive mood encourages 
the use of schemas (Bodenhausen, Kramer, & Suesser, 1994), promotes the solving of insight 
problems by increasing transfer (Rowe, Hirsch, & Anderson, 2007), and focuses attention on the 
global aspects of stimuli (Gasper & Clore, 2002).  
 However, drawing these global connections as a result of being in a good mood can be a 
disadvantage, depending on the goal of the task. As an example of this, Storbeck and Clore 
(2005) induced mood through music and then had participants complete the Deese-Roediger-
McDermott (DRM) paradigm. In this paradigm (Roediger & McDermott, 1995), participants are 
presented with a list of related words (e.g., freeze, shiver, arctic) that are missing one highly 
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associated word (e.g., cold), which is referred to as the critical lure. If participants incorrectly 
recall the critical lure as part of the original list, they are thought to have constructed a false 
memory. In the Storbeck and Clore (2005) study, participants in a positive mood were more 
likely to recall the critical lures; in other words, these participants, who were in a positive mood, 
formed the association between the list of related words and the critical lure, leading them to 
mistakenly recall the critical lure. It should be noted, though, that a later study demonstrated this 
trend only occurs when the mood induction procedure is performed before participants study the 
list of words (Storbeck & Clore, 2011), suggesting that the association made (due to the positive 
mood) occurred during encoding (i.e., not retrieval).   
 In contrast to the research on positive moods, a negative mood can prevent false 
memories due to what has been termed item specific processing (Brainerd & Reyna, 1998; 
Fiedler, 2001; Hunt & McDaniel, 1993). This involves processing the unique features (or details) 
of stimuli, rather than considering the stimuli in relation to other concepts. Because those in a 
negative mood are less likely to make connections among related concepts, they are less likely to 
be susceptible to false memories (Storbeck & Clore, 2005), the influence of scripts (Bless et al., 
1996), and the reliance on stereotypes (Isbell, 2004); in other words, they are making fewer 
inferences or connections. In contrast to a positive mood, a negative mood enhances memory for 
specific details that are in one’s focus (Kensinger, Garoff-Eaton, & Schacter, 2007), analytical 
thinking (Bless, Bohner, Schwarz, & Strack, 1990), performance on deductive reasoning tasks 
(Oaksford, Morris, Graniger, & Williams, 1996) and improves performance on spatial tasks 
(Gray, 2001).  
 Not surprisingly, because mood influences the focus of attention, it also impacts what is 
remembered about the stimuli or the event itself. Specifically, a vast amount of research suggests 
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that a positive mood increases memory for extrinsic contextual details and a negative mood 
increases memory for intrinsic item features (for a review, see Kensinger, 2009). For instance, 
studying an image of a car accident (i.e., a stimulus inducing a negative mood) will produce high 
accuracy for the accident but not for the surrounding context, such as the street where the 
accident occurred (Buchanan & Adolphs, 2002; Reisberg & Heuer, 2004). The visual details of 
negative items (e.g., snake) are also more likely to be remembered than positive items (e.g., 
cake) (Kensinger, Garoff-Eaton, & Schacter, 2007; Kensinger & Schacter, 2008). The lack of 
encoding for details can carry over to stimuli or events presented shortly after, such as a negative 
word blocking the memory for the subsequent word (Hurlemann et al., 2005). 
 While the studies mentioned above used stimuli that can clearly be put in a positive or 
negative category, the trends hold up even when the valence of the event is determined by the 
perceiver. For example, after a professional baseball game in which the Red Sox beat the 
Yankees, the Yankees fans (who were in a negative mood due to their team losing) remembered 
event details more accurately (Kensinger & Schacter, 2006). Additionally, Germans who did not 
support the fall of the Berlin Wall (and, hence, were in more of a negative mood) reported more 
accurate details about the event (Bohn & Berntsen, 2007). Similarly, people who disagreed with 
the verdict in the O.J. Simpson trial were less likely to “falsely” recognize fictitious events from 
the trial; in other words, being in more of a negative mood was related to them being more 
accurate (Levine & Bluck, 2004). These findings all support the affect- as-information 
hypothesis in real word scenarios, with individuals in a negative mood focusing more on the 
details which results in stronger memory of those details to a greater extent than those in a 
positive mood.   
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 Although negative mood draws attention away from contextual details so that attention 
can be focused on the mood inducing stimuli, sometimes this memory trade-off can be overcome 
when people are given specific encoding instructions. In one study, when young adults were 
instructed to remember all aspects of an accident scene (i.e., have a broader focus) they were 
able to overcome the usual narrowing of attention that accompanies a negative mood; however, it 
should be noted that older adults still had a narrow focus and were unable to remember the 
contextual details (Kensinger, Piguet, Krendl, & Corkin, 2005). This finding suggests that it is 
possible that people can be trained to have a broadening of attention with some negative stimuli 
but that it does require extra cognitive resources, which is why older adults were unable to 
overcome the deficit.   
 It is important to point out that the research reviewed so far focuses on the valence of 
mood, or the general state of feeling positive or negative. However, recent research has found 
that motivational direction should also be considered (e.g., Harmon-Jones, Gable, & Price, 
2013). Motivational direction is the degree to which a particular affective stimulus encourages a 
behavior. For example, viewing a cat film is considered low approach while viewing desserts is 
considered high approach (Gable & Harmon-Jones, 2008). This is because while most people 
find cat films entertaining, it does not encourage them to take any action; in contrast, seeing an 
appealing food typically makes people hungry. This motivational direction changes the focus of 
attention, making those who watch the dessert film have a narrower focus on a visual processing 
task. Furthermore, the attention is narrowed even more when participants are told that they will 
be able to consume the desserts after viewing the pictures. Therefore, the usual broadening of 
attention does not occur when people are motivated to perform a behavior. Although, this 
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dissertation will be focusing on valence, motivational direction will be considered when 
choosing stimuli. 
 Altogether, a body of evidence demonstrates that mood changes how people process and 
remember information. Because the studies highlighted above all involve explicit memory, 
learning, and problem solving tasks, the question remains whether mood influences implicit 
learning. The affect-as-information hypothesis is based on the idea that attention gets altered by 
mood, thus influencing learning and memory outcomes. However, as previously reviewed, 
attention is tied to better implicit learning performance, but full attention is not required. 
Therefore, it is possible that mood may not change how people perform on an implicit learning 
task. Also, it is hard to predict whether a global focus or narrow focus would be optimal for 
implicit learning performance. In the next section, I review the dimension of arousal, how it 
interacts with mood, and how it influences cognition.  
Arousal 
 While the majority of studies, especially in the cognitive realm, have focused on valence 
(i.e., general direction of mood), arousal is another dimension that should be considered. Arousal 
refers to the level of excitement that characterizes the dimension. For example, a picture of a 
garden elicits feelings of pleasantness (i.e., valence) but also calmness, which is low in arousal. 
In contrast, a picture of skydiving elicits feelings of both pleasantness (i.e., valence) and 
excitement, which is high in arousal.  
 Arousal is often measured by having participants rate stimuli (e.g., images) with the Self-
Assessment Mankin (SAM; Lang, 1980). Participants rate their arousal level on a 1 to 9 scale, 
with a 1 representing calm / unaroused and a 9 representing excitement / aroused. The number 
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scale is accompanied by images of a cartoon character depicting various levels of arousal (see 
Figure 2) because the pictures allow the scale to be presented to children and those from different 
cultures. To gather data about valence, it is often presented concurrently with a similar scale that 
has one extreme representing pleasant / happy and the other representing unpleasant / unhappy.  
 In addition to mood, arousal is another aspect that influences how we perceive our 
environment and remember experiences. In general, arousal is known to enhance memory for 
details by focusing attention (Cahill & McGaugh, 1998; Hamann, 2001), such as what occurs 
during the weapon-focus effect where eye witnesses focus on the weapon and then remember 
fewer details about other objects or people (Loftus, Loftus, & Messo, 1987). While most research 
has used stimuli that are both arousing and valent, a few studies have shown that arousal is not 
always needed to enhance memory (Kensinger & Corkin, 2003, LaBar & Phelps, 1998; Ochsner, 
2000). This disassociation is believed to occur because valence and arousal rely on different 
memory processes. Arousal increases consolidation processes due to the recruitment of the 
amygdala while non-arousing stimuli rely more on elaborate encoding processes (for a review, 
see Kensinger, 2004).  
 The interplay of arousal and valence is complex and disputed and there are a few models 
that account for both arousal and valence. The cicumplex model (Barrett & Russel, 1998; Posner, 
Russell, & Peterson, 2005; Russel, 1980) proposes that arousal (referred to as activation) and 
valence are independent dimensions and that the core emotions of each category can be fitted 
around the perimeter of a circle at 45 degree increments, resulting in different types of positive 
and negative moods. For example, on the one hand, graduate students could be in an elated mood 
because they just passed their dissertation proposal. It is likely that they have a high level of 
arousal because they are excited about completing a goal and that they also have a high level of 
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valence because the successful proposal put them into a good mood.  On the other hand, those 
same graduate students could also be in a good mood but not be activated (i.e., calm) if they 
were relaxing at the spa the day after their defense. A second account of arousal and valence 
(Watson, Wiese, Vaidya, & Tellegan, 1999) proposed that the dimensions are more of a 
hierarchy with valence being the primary dimension at the top followed by the arousal dimension 
in each valence category. While there is disagreement surrounding how these dimensions are 
related, both accounts agree that valence and arousal are separate dimensions. 
 While arousal has not been the focus in studies examining mood and explicit learning, it 
is very relevant to implicit learning because many of the stimuli used in studies, particularly the 
negative stimuli, are inherently arousing. Thus, it is possible that arousal, which has not been 
measured in earlier studies, could contribute to performance. Because of this, arousal will be 
considered in the design of these dissertation experiments. In the next section, I review the few 
studies that have investigated mood and implicit processes. 
Mood and Implicit Learning 
To date there have been very few studies that have examined the relationship between 
mood states and implicit learning and, unfortunately, the results of these studies are somewhat 
mixed. For instance, there is a discrepancy with the findings for the two studies that examined 
mood and the serial reaction time task. On the one hand, Pretz, Totz, and Kaufman (2010) had 
participants perform a serial reaction time task after viewing mood inducing pictures and found 
no differences between mood groups. On the other hand, Shang, Fu, Dienes, Shao, and Fun 
(2013) found that participants in a positive mood, as induced with music, performed better in a 
serial reaction time task. The researchers noted the discrepancy between their results and the 
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Pretz et al. (2010) study by emphasizing that Pretz et al. (2010) (a) used a more complex 
sequence and (b) the mood induction procedure was different in that Pretz et al. (2010) used 
images instead of music. The Shang et al. (2013) findings align well with the affect-as-
information hypothesis (Scharz & Clore, 1983), which postulates that positive mood increases 
access to prior knowledge in explicit learning tasks.  
  In a different study, Bertels, Demoulin, Franco, and Destrebecqz (2013) induced mood 
aurally through stories while simultaneously presenting participants with shapes in a statistical 
learning paradigm. Participants performed a forced-choice recognition test, which is usually 
employed in statistical learning tasks, along with a Rapid Serial Visual Presentation (RSVP) task 
where participants had to identify targets from the exposure phase among distractors as quickly 
as possible. While the negative mood group and neutral group (there was no positive mood 
group) performed similarly, even after a 20 minute delay, the negative group was more confident 
in their decisions (i.e., less likely to report guessing). However, as the authors suggested, it is 
possible that the negative group were paying more attention to the stimuli in order to avoid 
listening to the negative story.  
 Another study examined the effect of mood on the detection of covariation, which is a 
process that can lead to implicit learning (Braverman, 2005). Participants’ moods were induced 
through movie clips and they then viewed faces that were accompanied by verbal (e.g., 80) and 
math scores (e.g., 20) on a hypothetical test. Math and verbal scores were chosen because the 
researcher believed that neither was related to stereotypes. The participants were instructed to 
pay attention to which score was higher. Unbeknownst to the participants, nose size was 
correlated with scores (i.e., a higher math score was correlated with a larger nose). Participants 
then had to take a test with new faces and guess which score was higher. Participants in the 
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negative mood group detected the covariation more often than the positive group, and the effect 
remained even after removing the participants who noticed the covariation. Subsequent 
experiments found that including a digit string task, thus adding cognitive load, made the effect 
less powerful, and increasing motivation via a reward eliminated the differences between the 
mood groups. This set of experiments demonstrate that mood affects the detection of covariation, 
but that other factors such as motivation and the cognitive demands of the task can also influence 
the ability to detect covariation in one’s environment. 
 Depression could be considered a more long lasting mood state so it makes sense to 
examine how depressed individuals perform on implicit learning tasks. There have been a few 
studies examining this relationship, but there is again somewhat of a discrepancy with the 
findings. Two studies examined mild depression with implicit learning on an artificial grammar 
task (Rathus, Reber, Manza, & Kushner, 1994) and a serial reaction time task (Pedersen et al., 
2009) but found no differences compared to healthy controls. However, two other studies found 
that those with moderate to severe depression had worse performance on serial reaction time task 
compared to controls (Naismith, Hickie, Ward, Scott, & Little, 2006; Naismith et al., 2010). It is 
important to mention that the participants in the Naismith et al. (2006) study also performed 
worse on neuropsycholgical tests, such as visuomotor speed, so it is possible that general 
cognitive deficits were driving performance on the implicit learning measures.  
 Pretz et al. (2010) have been the only researchers to study the effect of mood (not related 
to being clinically depressed) on implicit learning with an artificial grammar paradigm. They 
induced mood by having participants view 50 pictures from the International Affective Picture 
System (IAPS) (Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1997) to either induce a positive, negative, or 
neutral mood and then memorized 20 letter strings from Reber’s (1967) artificial grammar. They 
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were tested with 50 grammatical strings; 7 were from the original set, 19 were consistent with 
the grammar, and 24 were non grammatical. Although the authors predicted a positive mood 
would facilitate implicit learning, they found the opposite, where negative mood facilitated 
grammar learning with participants in the negative mood condition outperforming those is the 
positive and neutral condition. The researchers suggested that perhaps a more analytic style of 
thinking is more conducive to performing well on implicit learning tasks and pointed out that 
implicit learning does not rely on heuristics or schemas (which a positive mood is known to 
increase the use of).  
  In summary, there have only been a handful of studies that examined mood and implicit 
learning processes and only one of these studies used an artificial grammar. The two studies 
utilizing the serial reaction time paradigm have conflicting findings, with one finding significant 
differences (Bertels et al., 2003) and the other no significant differences (Pretz et al., 2010). 
Overall, these studies demonstrate that more research needs to be conducted to determine 
whether mood influences implicit learning.  
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CHAPTER 3 
EXPERIMENT OVERVIEW 
 The purpose of this dissertation was to examine whether mood influences implicit 
learning. As described in the previous section, the few studies that have been conducted have 
provided no clear consensus as to whether or how mood influences implicit learning. Of 
particular interest to the current investigation, only one study has used an artificial grammar 
paradigm (Pretz et al., 2010). I think it is important to more thoroughly investigate the 
relationship between mood and implicit learning to determine whether people’s mood can have 
bearings on how they perceive relationships in their environment and what mood state may be 
more beneficial for optimal performance in a setting where it may be crucial to learn patterns in 
the environment.  
 To explore the impact of mood on implicit learning, I employed an artificial grammar 
paradigm where mood inducing images were used instead of letters. Therefore, the mood 
induction procedure is integral, meaning that the mood state is related to the cognitive task. In 
contrast, Pretz et al. (2010) used an incidental mood manipulation procedure, first having 
participants view mood pictures and then study strings of letters. An integral mood manipulation 
procedure was chosen in the current investigation to simulate how affective objects / stimuli in 
one’s environment may influence learning. For example, if a soldier witnessed an Improvised 
Explosive Device (IED) harm some of his comrades, will he have learned the cues in the 
environment to next time pick up on the cues that lead to the IED explosion?  
 Due to the little research that has been conducted in the area and because the proposed 
method differed substantially from Pretz et al. (2010), a pilot study was conducted first.  As a 
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preview of those results, the opposite trend as Pretz et al. (2010) was found, in which a positive 
mood increased implicit learning on an artificial grammar task. One possibility is that the type of 
mood task used (i.e., integral versus incidental) might predict how mood interacts with implicit 
learning. However, because it is not yet known what is driving the discrepancy, Experiment 1 
attempted to replicate the exact Pretz et al. (2010) experiment as closely as possible by following 
the methods from that paper, to see if the same trend is obtained. Therefore, in Experiment 1, 
participants viewed pictures, then viewed letters derived from the Reber (1967) study, and then 
took a grammar test.  
 Experiment 2 built upon and improved the pilot experiment. This also served as another 
test to examine whether the Pretz et al. findings were an anomaly. The key manipulation in 
Experiment 2 was whether the images were positive, neutral, or negative. In addition, arousal 
was taken into account and two positive groups were created: positive-high arousal and positive-
low arousal. Unlike in the pilot experiment, all images were selected from the International 
Affective Picture System (IAPS) (Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1997), which is a database of 
standardized images that have been used in several mood studies. Examples of positive images 
are puppies, ice cream, nature scenes, and depictions of romantic relationships. Examples of 
negative images are poverty, animal abuse, and death. Neutral pictures include depictions of 
mundane objects such as a trains, satellites, or clocks. 
 The other manipulation in Experiment 2 was whether the participants received a training 
phase or not. The training phase refers to the presentation phase where participants are exposed 
to the grammar, which is an essential component of the artificial grammar paradigm. The benefit 
of having a condition where participants only complete the test ensures that the grammar is not 
explicit enough that people can detect the underlying pattern without a presentation phase. 
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Therefore, including a test-only group serves as a control and this method has been employed in 
recent implicit learning studies (e.g., Covas-Smith, 2011; Patterson et al., 2011).  
  Based on studies that have looked at mood and more explicit types of learning (e.g., 
Gasper & Clore, 2002), as well as the pilot study results, it was predicted that a positive mood 
would produce higher implicit learning scores. Specifically, according to the affect-as-
information hypothesis, a positive mood encourages relational processing, indicating that 
participants in a positive mood would be more likely to process incoming information in relation 
to other concepts presented around it. Based on what has been observed in previous studies, it is 
possible that the broadening of attention will be beneficial in picking up the regularity of the 
grammar. However, a somewhat weaker case could be made for a negative mood making people 
better at implicit learning tasks as was demonstrated in the Pretz et al. (2010) study. If this 
pattern were observed, it would be because the narrowing of attention might help people learn 
the exemplars or chunks better. Because of the larger number of studies showing benefits of 
positive mood for making connections, the former outcome is thought to be more likely.   
 The second goal of this investigation was to examine whether mood would influence the 
ability to learn at a categorical level. Similar to Experiment 2, Experiment 3 also presented mood 
inducing images with an artificial grammar paradigm; the major difference was that instead of 
repeating the same (i.e., identical) pictures, Experiment 3 presented similar, but different pictures 
to represent the same ‘letter’. For example, in Experiment 2, the same cute puppy picture was 
shown each time to represent a designated ‘letter’ in the sequence. However, in Experiment 3, a 
different puppy was shown each time that ‘letter’ is presented in a sequence. This is similar to 
the paradigm that Brady and Oliva (2008) employed except that they used a statistical learning 
paradigm and their images were not mood inducing. It could be argued that this design resembles 
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implicit learning more in real world setting where a particular object / person / situation is not 
likely to be exactly the same, but might come from a similar category.  
 In Experiment 3, it was hypothesized that the positive mood group would also 
demonstrate higher overall performance on the implicit learning test. The Brady and Oliva 
(2008) study found evidence of people being able to learn rather easily at a categorical level. 
While they did not manipulate mood, research looking at mood and explicit learning has found 
that relational processing tends to be humans’ default style of processing (e.g., Gasper & Clore, 
2002). Therefore, it was speculated that the negative group will perform worse than the other 
groups (i.e., the two positive groups and the neutral group), and that the differences might be 
more extreme than in Experiment 2 due to the use of different pictures especially relying on 
drawing connections between incoming information.  
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CHAPTER 4 
PILOT EXPERIMENT 
 Given the small number of studies that have been conducted in the area of implicit 
learning and mood, a pilot study was conducted to serve two purposes: 1) to first examine 
whether there would be a difference between the mood groups, and 2) to determine whether the 
complexity of the grammar would make a difference in participant performance. As a reminder, 
although Pretz et al. (2010) used an artificial grammar paradigm, they did the mood induction 
separately from the training phase, and the artificial grammar task consisted of letters. This pilot 
experiment was different in that the mood inducing pictures followed a finite state diagram; in 
other words, the training phase and the mood induction were the same phase of the experiment. 
Furthermore, because the Pretz et al. (2010) results do not necessarily line up with the patterns 
observed by other studies investigating the affect-as-information hypothesis, there was a need to 
replicate their experiment before pursuing it for dissertation work. 
Method 
Participants  
 A total of 146 participants were recruited from the subject pool at the University of 
Nevada, Las Vegas. Within the simple grammar condition, 34 participants were randomly 
assigned to the positive mood group in the simple grammar condition and 32 to the negative 
mood group. Within the complex grammar condition, 42 were randomly assigned to the positive 
mood group and 37 to the negative mood group. Participants were issued research credit for their 
psychology course. All participants were able to fluently speak and comprehend English.  
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Materials 
Pictures depicting positive and negative moods were selected from the internet. These 
pictures were rated by two individuals (the experimenter and a graduate student) in terms of 
positive and negative mood inducement; only pictures that were rated as clearly positive and 
clearly negative by both raters were included in those categories – any pictures with a 
discrepancy of opinion were not used (see Appendix B for a complete set of the images). The 
Positive And Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS) was used for the mood manipulation check 
(Watson et al., 1988). The PANAS contains 10 positive mood words (e.g., alert) and 10 negative 
mood words (e.g., upset) (see Appendix C for a complete set of items). As mentioned previously, 
the PANAS is the most widely used mood measure and is found to be highly reliable and valid 
(Crawford & Henry, 2004). 
The order of the pictures was determined using a finite state diagram. For the simple 
condition, the Reber (1967) artificial grammar was used (see Figure 1). For the complex 
condition, a modified version of the Reber and Allen (1978) grammar was used (see Figure 2). A 
picture was selected to represent each of the nodes (see Figures 3, 4, 5, and 6) in the same 
manner that letters were assigned to nodes in the Reber (1967) and Reber and Allen (1978) 
studies. The mood image sequence begins when the diagram is entered on the left and ends when 
the diagram exits on the right. Therefore, the length of the sequence can vary depending on the 
paths that are followed through the diagram. However, the length of each sequence was restricted 
to between 4 and 9 nodes. For example, one sequence might be mountain, dessert, mountain, and 
old couple if a path was followed along 0120’; another might be baby, dog, dog, baby, dessert, 
and old couple if a path was followed along 03420’.  
37 
 
The sequences that were produced are referred to as the ‘structured set’ (see Appendix D 
for a list of the full set). Quasi-random sequences were generated and presented during test. 
These sequences are referred to as the ‘unstructured set’. The random sequences were generated 
by fixing the beginning and end of the sequences but scrambling the middle portion to 
discourage judgments during the recognition test being based on rules learned.  
Procedure 
After the consent process, participants completed the Positive And Negative Affect 
Schedule (PANAS) (Watson et al., 1988) on Qualtrics (Qualtrics, Provo, UT) to determine their 
baseline mood state. The participants then watched positive or negative picture sequences on a 
PowerPoint presentation for 5 seconds per sequence with 1 second pauses between the 
sequences. The mood induction and the training phase of the implicit learning task was the same. 
In other words, the mood induction procedure was integral, in that the stimuli themselves were 
mood inducing. Similar to other implicit learning studies (e.g., Patterson et al., 2013), 
participants were not told to direct their attention or to memorize the stimuli, nor were they given 
feedback. However, for ethical reasons, participants in the negative mood group were told that 
some of the pictures may upset them and reminded that they can quit the experiment at any time. 
The order of the pictures was determined using a finite state algorithm but the same order was 
used for every participant in the negative condition and the same order was used for every 
participant in the positive mood condition. Twenty sequences were presented 16 times, leading 
the presentation phase to be approximately 30 minutes. 
After the training phase, participants immediately completed the PANAS again to ensure 
that the mood manipulation procedure was effective. They were then informed that the pictures 
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they just viewed were following an underlying pattern. They were administered a yes / no 
recognition test on paper where they circled ‘yes’ for the picture sequence being structured (i.e., 
consistent with the pattern) and circled ‘no’ for the picture sequence being unstructured (i.e., 
inconsistent with the pattern). The test consisted of a total of 60 sequences: 20 sequences that 
were previously presented, 20 sequences that were novel but consistent with the finite-state 
grammar, and 20 random sequences (i.e., foils). The order of the sequences was randomized but 
was the same order for every participant. After the test, participants were thanked, debriefed, and 
given credit for their participation. 
Results 
PANAS 
 The positive group had a positive affect score on the PANAS of 31.11 and a negative 
affect score of 17.91 after the presentation phase. The negative mood group had a positive affect 
score of 27.12 and a negative affect score of 28.50. It is unknown why the negative mood group 
retained such a high positive affect score but one possibility is that due to the mere exposure 
effect, perhaps viewing the same pictures several times, albeit negative, made people slightly 
more positive. However, there were still performance differences between the groups (as noted 
below).  
Grammar Test 
 For the simple grammar, the recognition test revealed that overall accuracy was 63.333%. 
An independent-samples t – test was performed between the positive and negative mood groups, 
with the positive mood group (M = 66.970%, SE = 1.391) outperforming the negative mood 
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group (M = 60.016%, SE = 1.711), t (64) = 2.811, p = 0.007. For the complex grammar, the 
overall accuracy on the recognition test was 52.350%. An independent t – test performed 
between the mood groups revealed that the positive mood group (M = 54.683 %, SE =1.484) 
again outperformed the negative mood group (M = 50.181 %, SE = 1.182), t (77) = 2.33, p = 
0.022 (see Figure 8). 
Discussion 
 These results demonstrated that there were significant differences between mood groups 
in both grammar conditions, which demonstrated that this area of research is a worthwhile 
pursuit for dissertation work. However, interestingly, the results were in the opposite direction 
than what was observed in the Pretz et al. (2010) study, but they are more consistent with the 
affect-as-information hypothesis. As a reminder, unlike the earlier study, the mood induction 
process here was integral, so it is possible that this contributed to the current findings being 
different than the Pretz et al. (2010) study (which induced mood separate from the learning 
phase). One possibility is that because a certain amount of attention is required to implicitly 
learn, perhaps the negative images made those in the negative condition not direct less attention 
to the patterns. Another possibility is that the unique pictures that were chosen for the pilot was 
driving the effect and perhaps this effect would not be observed with standardized images. 
Finally, another possibility is that the Pretz et al. (2010) results were an anomaly; this possibly as 
well as other factors that may influence implicit learning were explored more in the following 
experiments.  
  
40 
 
CHAPTER 5 
EXPERIMENT 1 
Method 
Participants  
 A total of 114 participants were recruited from the subject pool at the University of 
Nevada, Las Vegas; none of them participated in the pilot experiment. Thirty-eight participants 
were in each of the three mood groups: positive, negative, and neutral (this n is similar to the 
number of participants that participated in the Pretz et al. (2010) study which had a sample size 
of 109). Participants were issued research credit for their psychology course. All participants 
were able to fluently speak and comprehend English.  
Materials 
 As in the Pretz et al. (2010) study, pictures from the International Affective Picture 
System were used to induce mood. The IAPS is a standardized database of pictures used to 
induce mood in a standardized setting. The pictures have been rated for both valence (i.e., mood) 
and arousal (i.e., level of excitement). They have been rated on a 9 point scale, with 1 
representing unpleasant and 9 representing pleasant for valance and 1 representing calm and 9 
representing excited for arousal. Because the Pretz et al. method did not indicate which exact 
pictures were used, pictures were chosen that had similar valence ratings. The pictures chosen for 
the positive condition have a mean valence rating of 7.59 (SD = 1.49) and an arousal rating of 
4.95 (SD = 2.37) on 9 point scale. Unfortunately, the pictures cannot be included in the 
appendices due to the fact that I had to sign an agreement with the creators of the database that I 
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would not include the pictures in any print format; however, see Appendix F for the IAPS 
numbers and image ratings. As a general description, the positive pictures include images such as 
people smiling, families, couples, and babies. The negative pictures have a mean valence rating 
of 2.39 (SD = 1.51) and arousal rating of 5.60 (SD = 2.20). The negative images depicted themes 
such as abuse, accidents, and death. The neutral images have a mean valence rating of 5.07 (SD 
= 1.35) and arousal rating of 3.50 (SD = 2.00). The set included images of household items, 
people performing mundane activities, and manmade structures such as golfing and crossword 
puzzles.  
 The Positive And Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS) were used for the mood 
manipulation check (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). As noted in the pilot study, the PANAS 
contains 10 positive mood words (e.g., alert) and 10 negative mood words (e.g., upset). 
Participants rated how they were feeling at the current moment on a scale of 1 to 5 (1 being not 
at all and 5 being extremely).  
 Although the Pretz et al (2010) study used both an artificial grammar learning task and 
the serial reaction time task, the current replication only included the artificial grammar task as it 
is most relevant to the current investigation. The artificial grammar task was duplicated as 
closely as possible, but the paper did omit some details; these were filled in based on methods 
used in other artificial grammar learning studies (e.g., Patterson et al., 2013). Twenty letter 
sequences generated from the Reber (1967) finite-state diagram were used during the 
presentation phase. The grammar test included a total of 50 letter sequences with 7 from the 
presentation phase, 19 letter sequences that were novel but were not included in the presentation 
phase, and 24 non-grammatical letter sequences. See Appendix E for the complete set of 
materials that was used in the artificial grammar test. 
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Procedure 
 Experiment 1 was conducted using Qualtrics (Qualtrics, Provo, UT); and after 
consenting, participants were asked to view pictures. If they were in the negative mood 
condition, they were given a warning that the pictures were graphic and reminded that they could 
withdraw from the study at any time. The pictures were automated and appeared on the computer 
screen for 5 s with 1.5 s blank screen between pictures, just like the Pretz et al. (2010) study. 
Immediately afterward, they completed the PANAS.  
 Following the PANAS, they began the artificial grammar learning task. Most artificial 
grammar studies (e.g., Patterson et al., 2013) do not instruct participant to direct their attention or 
memorize the stimuli; however, because the previous study (Pretz et al., 2010) explicitly 
instructed participants to memorize the sequences, participants in the current study were also 
asked to do this. Because the Pretz et al. (2010) study did not describe how long the letters were 
shown, Experiment 1 used display times similar to other related studies (e.g., Covas-Smith, 
2011); specifically, the letter strings were shown for 4 seconds with a 1 second blank screen.   
 After viewing the sequences of letters, participants were made aware that the sequences 
they tried to memorize had an underlying pattern. They were then asked to make grammatical 
judgments by answering ‘yes’ with the mouse to sequences they believed were structured (i.e., 
consistent with the pattern) and answering ‘no’ with the mouse for the picture sequence being 
unstructured (i.e., inconsistent with the pattern). Participants were then thanked for their time, 
debriefed, and assigned credit.  
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Design and Analysis 
 To check whether the mood manipulation procedure was effective, the PANAS scores 
were submitted to a between-subjects Analysis of Variance (ANOVA). A separate ANOVA was 
run for Positive Affect and Negative Affect. Test scores on the grammar test were submitted to a 
between-subjects ANOVA with mood group (positive, negative, neutral) as the independent 
variable. If the results conform with the original study (Pretz et al., 2010), then the negative 
group will outperform both the positive and neutral groups. It was predicted that this trend would 
be found because there is no reason to believe that the Pretz et al., (2010) would not replicate. 
Results 
PANAS 
 The mean PANAS scores are presented in Figure 10. A between-subjects ANOVA 
indicated that the mood induction had a marginally significant effect on Positive Affect scores, 
F(2, 111) = 2.763, MSE = 174.588, p = 0.067, η 
2 = 
0.047, and a significant effect on the 
Negative Affect scores, F (2,111) = 63.425, MSE = 1620.500, p < .001, η 
2 
= 0.533. A Tukey’s 
Hones Significant Difference (HSD) post hoc test revealed that the positive and negative group 
were statistically significant from each other (p < .001, SE = 1.160) with the negative group 
reporting higher Negative Affect scores. The negative group also reported higher Negative 
Affect than the neutral group (p < .001, SE = 1.160). However, the positive and neutral groups 
were not statistically significant in their reported Negative Affect scores. 
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Grammar Test 
 Percent scores from the grammar test were averaged to create group means for each 
mood condition (negative, positive, neutral) and the means are presented in Figure 10 (also see 
Figure 11 for a boxplot). All groups scored above chance (i.e., 50%), t (113) = 13.076, p < .001. 
The group means were submitted to a one-way between-subjects ANOVA. For all analyses, an 
alpha level of 0.05 was used to determine statistical significance. The test indicated that overall, 
mood did have a significant effect on grammar test scores F(2, 111) = 3.212, MSE = 0.024, p = 
0.044, η 
2 
=
 
.054. Follow up t-tests were conducted to compare group differences and a Tukey’s 
Honest Significant Difference (HSD) post hoc test revealed significant differences only between 
the negative group (M = 61.110, SD = 7.289) and the neutral group (M = 58.020 SD = 81.800), p 
= 0.036.    
 Signal detection analysis scores were computed to determine the ability of the 
participants to perceive the signals (i.e., sequences) from the background noise for both the 
correct items and the consistent items on the grammar test. As a reminder, the correct items are 
the sequences that were presented to the participants during the viewing phase and the consistent 
items are sequences that were not presented during the viewing phase but are consistent with the 
artificial grammar. Hit rate, miss rate, false alarm rate, correction rejection rate, sensitivity (d’), 
and criterion(c) were computed and are shown in Tables 1 and 2. All the signal detection 
analyses were submitted to a between-subjects ANOVA and revealed that hit rate and miss rate 
(which are complimentary values) was significant, (F (2, 111) = 4.051, MS = 0.164, p = 0.020. A 
follow up Tukey HSD test indicated that the negative (M = 0.688, SD = 0.169) and neutral group 
(M = 0.560, SD = 0.211) were statistically different from each other, p = 0.018. The measure of 
sensitivity (d’) was also significant, F (2,111) = 3.548, MS = 0.102, p = 0.032, with negative (M 
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= 0.717, SD = 0.557) and neutral group (M = 0.352, SD = 0.352) again being statistically 
significant from each other, p = 0.024. There were no other statistical differences for the other 
three signal detection measures for consistent items and no differences for all six signal detection 
measures for the consistent items (all p >0.05). 
Discussion 
 The PANAS showed that the mood induction was successful. The accuracy data showed 
that those in the negative group outperformed those in the positive and neutral group, with the 
neutral group performing the worst. The signal detection analysis measure showed that negative 
participants had significantly more hits, misses, and sensitivity (d’) for the correct items. There 
were no differences for consistent items between mood groups.  
 This pattern of results for Experiment 1 successfully replicated the trend from the Pretz et 
al. (2010) study, although the differences between mood groups were smaller here. In the current 
investigation, only the negative and neutral mood groups were significantly different from each 
other, but in their study they found all three groups to be significantly different from one another; 
however, they only reported their results with a covariate. A final point is that after the 
completion of Experiment 1 of this dissertation, it was discovered that the Pretz et al. (2010) 
study was based on an unpublished undergraduate thesis; the experiment description in this 
thesis was more detailed and revealed that participants saw the letter strings two times and had to 
type in the letter strings immediately after seeing them, which is not a typical artificial grammar 
learning procedure. Therefore, the method used in those studies encourages people to focus their 
attention and that could potentially benefit those negative mood participants who were already 
experiencing a narrowing of attention due to the mood induction procedure. 
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 While these results are in line with Pretz et al. (2010), they are only partially in line with 
the affect-as-information hypothesis. As a reminder, the affect-as-information hypothesis posits 
that those in a negative mood have a narrower focus of attention and a better memory for details. 
In this sense the affect-as-information was supported because the negative group scored higher 
on the correct items that were presented during the viewing phase, suggesting that the negative 
mood could have improved their memory for the exact letter strings. At this point, it is unclear 
why the trends in Pretz et al. (2010) and Experiment 1 contradicted the pilot study. One 
possibility is that the results from the former are more driven by arousal than valence. After all, 
the positive and negative groups were not statistically different and both had higher levels of 
arousal than the neutral group. To examine this more closely, Experiment 2 included two 
positive mood groups: one with high arousal images and one with low arousal images. 
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CHAPTER 6 
EXPERIMENT 2 
Method 
Participants  
 A total of 188 participants (47 per mood condition) were recruited from the subject pool 
at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas; none of them participated in the earlier experiments. 
Participants were issued research credit for their psychology course. All participants were able to 
fluently speak and comprehend English and had normal or corrected vision. 
Materials and Procedures 
Like the pilot, Experiment 2 had a mood induction phase that also served as the learning 
phase. This differed from Experiment 1 where the mood induction was separate. Also, in 
Experiment 2 participants were presented and tested with pictures instead of letters. All of the 
tasks were completed on a PC using Qualtrics (Qualtrics, Provo, UT). Mood condition and 
training condition were counterbalanced across participants. Additionally, four sets of pictures 
were created for each mood condition and these sets were counter-balanced across participants. 
The IAPS numbers for all the images used are listed in Appendix H. The participants selected for 
the training phase were asked to view picture sequences that were positive-high arousal, positive-
low arousal, negative, or neutral in valence for 5 seconds with 1 second pauses between the 
sequences. Unlike Experiment 1, participants were not instructed to direct their attention or 
memorize the stimuli; they  were not given any feedback. However, for ethical reasons, 
participants in all the training groups were told that some of the pictures may upset them and 
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reminded that they can quit the experiment at any time. It is unlikely that the participants in the 
positive and neutral groups would find the pictures upsetting but the warning was given to all 
groups in case the warning had a priming effect (No participants requested to quit.).  
As in the pilot experiment, the order of the pictures was determined using a finite state 
algorithm. Twenty sequences were presented 10 times leading to a presentation phase of 
approximately 30 minutes. The sequences were presented several times because increasing 
training typically produces better performance that is significantly greater than chance (Patterson 
et al., 2013). 
After the training phase, participants immediately completed the PANAS to ensure that 
the mood manipulation procedure was effective. They were then informed that the pictures they 
just viewed were following an underlying pattern and completed a yes / no recognition test on 
the computer where they selected ‘yes’ for the picture sequence being structured (i.e., consistent 
with the pattern) and ‘no’ for the picture sequence being unstructured (i.e., inconsistent with the 
pattern). The test consisted of 60 sequences; 20 that were previously presented, 20 sequences that 
were novel but consistent with the finite-state grammar, and 20 random sequences (i.e., foils). 
The order of the sequences was random. A separate group of participants were asked to make the 
distinction between the structured and unstructured sequences in a similar manner as the training 
groups.  
Participants then completed the Analysis-Holism Scale (AHS) (Choi, Koo, & Choi, 
2007). The AHS was used to examine whether the mood manipulation influences the way people 
perceive wholes versus parts. Specifically, the AHS is used to look at individual differences in 
regard to analytic versus holistic thinking. It includes 24 questions with a higher score being 
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associated with a preference for holistic thinking and lower scores associated with more analytic 
thinking. Participants rated statements such as, “Everything in the world is intertwined in a 
causal relationship,” on a 7 point scale (1= strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). Participants 
responded to each item by typing in the corresponding number for their response on a standard 
keyboard. See Appendix G for the full questionnaire. The participants were then debriefed and 
given credit for their participation. 
Design and Analyses 
 The primary dependent variable of interest is the percent correct for the recognition test. 
The mean scores were submitted to a 4 (mood: positive-high arousal, positive-low arousal, 
negative, or neutral) between-subjects ANOVA. Additionally, d’ and bias scores were computed 
for training conditions to examine how the mood manipulation impacted the sensitivity and 
tendency to respond ‘yes’. It was expected that the results would mirror the pilot with a main 
effect of mood, with the positive group performing the best on the test. This would be consistent 
with the affect-as-information hypothesis. Specifically, those in a positive mood have a 
broadening of attention, allowing them to form more connections. It was also expected that all 
the mood groups would perform above chance. With regards to the AHS, it was predicted that 
those in a positive mood would score more holistic and those in a negative mood would score 
more analytic. This would also be consistent with the affect-as-information hypothesis. 
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Results 
PANAS 
 The baseline mean Positive Affect score was 31.872 (SD = 7.833) and the baseline 
Negative Affect score was 15.181 (SD = 5.655). These are in line with normative momentary 
ratings of 29.7 (SD = 7.9) Positive Affect and 14.8 (SD = 5.4) Negative Affect as reported by 
Watson et al. (1988). The individual PANAS group means for pre and post mood induction are 
reported in Table 3. A paired-samples t-test was conducted to compare baseline scores to post 
mood induction scores. There was a significant decrease in Positive Affect scores from pre to 
post mood induction, t(187) = 7.587, SE = .5553, p < 0.001 for all groups. However, there were 
no significant differences for the Negative Affect scores.  
Grammar Test 
 Percent scores from the grammar test were averaged to create group means for each 
mood condition (negative, neutral, positive-high arousal, positive-low arousal) and the means are 
presented in Figure 12 (also see Figure 13 for a boxplot). To determine whether training (i.e., the 
viewing phase) increased performance over chance (i.e., 50 %), a t-test was conducted 
comparing grammar test scores to chance performance. The t – test indicated that performance 
was above chance, t (188) = 16.375, p < .001. To ensure that the pattern was not salient enough 
to learn without the presentation phase, a test-only group of participants was examined; as 
expected, they did not score above chance, t (75) = -1.359, p =0.178.  
 As in Experiment 1, the group means were submitted to a one-way between-subjects 
ANOVA. For all analyses, an alpha level of 0.05 was used to determine statistical significance. 
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The test indicated that overall, mood did not have a significant effect on grammar test scores, 
F(3, 184) = 1.251, MSE = 0.013, p = 0.293, η 
2
=
 
0.020.  
 As in Experiment 1, hit rate, miss rate, false alarm rate, correction rejection rate, 
sensitivity (d’), and criterion(c) were computed and are shown in Tables 4 and 5. For the correct 
items, there were no differences for all six signal detection measures, as revealed by between-
subjects ANOVAs (all p > 0.05). For consistent items, there was a marginal significant 
difference for sensitivity (d’) scores, (F(3, 184) = 2.353, MS = 0.754, p = 0.074) with the 
positive-high arousal condition having the highest sensitivity, followed by the negative 
condition, then positive–low arousal, and the neutral group was the least sensitive.  
AHS 
 Group means were computed for the four subdomains of the Analysis-Holism Scale and 
were submitted to a between subjects repeated ANOVA. There was a main effect of Analysis-
Holism subdomain, F(3, 184) = 19.058, p < 0.001, ηp 
2 
= 0.239, indicating that mean scores on 
the four different subscales were statistically significant from one another. There was not a 
significant main effect of mood, F(3, 184) = 1.018, MSE = 37.902, p = 0.386, ηp
2
 = 0.989. 
Finally, the interaction of AHS subdomains and mood was also not significant, F(9, 184) = 
1.623, MSE = 46.612, p = 0.105, ηp
2
 = 0.026. 
Discussion 
 Experiment 2 investigated the possibility that mood inducing pictures presented in the 
artificial grammar paradigm would influence performance. Specifically, it was predicted that a 
positive-low arousal mood would result in the best performance which would be consistent with 
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the affect-as-information hypothesis. However, this hypothesis was not really supported because 
while the positive-low arousal group had the highest performance, the difference was not 
significant. This could be due to the long viewing phase making participants less positive about 
the experiment. That is, they viewed the same five pictures that were embedded in 20 sequences 
that were each presented 10 times. This lengthy process may have led them to find the task to be 
boring, which could have reduced their focus on the materials in general. In fact, participants’ 
Positive Affect score decreased for all mood groups. Based on previous studies (Patterson et al., 
2013), a long viewing phase is necessary to ensure that participants are learning the underlying 
pattern; but, as described above, a longer viewing phase can have a potential cost. There were 
also no significant mood differences on the AHS. This could be due to the AHS tapping into 
beliefs that may not be as transient as mood; thus, the mood induction procedure was not enough 
to change a person’s overall cognitive style and way of viewing the world. The significant 
difference between the subdomains replicated previous research that found each subdomain 
distinct (Choi, Koo, & Choi, 2007).  
 To continue exploring different aspects of implicit learning, Experiment 3 investigated 
whether mood produces differences in implicit learning when a different picture is used to 
represent distinct categories. It was predicted that the positive-low arousal group would 
outperform the other groups and the differences would be more salient than in Experiment 2 due 
to larger variety of pictures hopefully being more pleasant to look at in the positive mood groups 
(i.e., not as repetitive, so therefore not as boring). Also, because a positive mood enhances the 
gist or big picture, it was predicted that the design of Experiment 3 would be more beneficial for 
the positive-low arousal group, leading to an outcome that would be consistent with the affect-
as-information hypothesis. In other words, because all groups would hopefully not be as bored, 
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the positive-low arousal group would retain the wider focus of attention associated with being in 
a positive mood. 
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CHAPTER 7 
EXPERIMENT 3 
Method 
Participants  
 A total of 200 participants were recruited from the subject pool at the University of 
Nevada, Las Vegas to place 50 participants per condition. Participants were issued research 
credit for their psychology course. All participants were able to fluently speak and comprehend 
English and had normal or corrected vision. None of these individuals participated in Experiment 
1 or 2. 
Materials and Procedure 
. The materials and procedure for Experiment 3 were identical to Experiment 2 except for 
two changes. The first change was that there was not a test-only group in Experiment 3 because 
the same artificial grammar was used in Experiment 2 and did not yield above chance scores for 
the non-training group.  The other change was that, instead of always using the same picture to 
represent a letter in the diagram (e.g., T for baby), a different picture was shown both during the 
presentation phase and during the testing phase. See Figures 14 to 17 for an example from every 
mood condition. Due to the IAPS not containing enough pictures, new pictures were found on 
the internet by the experimenter and were rated by a different group of participants prior to 
Experiment 3 to supplement the picture database. Pictures that had a Cronbach’s alpha reliability 
rating of 0.80 and up and mean valence and arousal ratings, similar to the IAPS images used in 
Experiment 2, were selected. See Table 6 for valence and arousal ratings.  
55 
 
Design and Analyses 
 As in Experiment 2, the primary dependent variable of interest was the percent correct of 
the recognition responses made by the participants. The mean scores were submitted to between-
subjects ANOVA (positive-high arousal, positive-low arousal, negative, and neutral). 
Additionally, d’ and bias scores were computed for training conditions to examine how the mood 
manipulation impacted the sensitivity and tendency to respond ‘yes’. It was expected that there 
would be a main effect of mood, with the positive-low arousal group performing the best on the 
test. This result would be consistent with the affect-as-information hypothesis with a positive 
mood broadening attention, thus leading to forming more relations between the categories. The 
positive-high arousal and neutral groups were predicted to have scores significantly different 
than the negative mood group. 
Results 
PANAS 
 The baseline mean Positive Affect score was 30.525 (SD = 8.091) and the baseline 
Negative Affect score was 15.770 (SD = 5.967). These scores were similar to the baseline scores 
in Experiment 2 and were also in line with normative momentary ratings of 29.7 (SD = 7.9) 
Positive Affect and 14.8 (SD =5.4) Negative Affect as reported by Watson et al. (1988). The 
individual PANAS group means for pre and post mood induction are reported in Table 7. A 
paired-samples t-test was conducted to compare baseline scores to post mood induction scores. 
There was a significant decrease in Positive Affect scores from pre to post mood induction, t 
(199) = 15.284, SE = .602, p < 0.001 for all groups. However, there were no significant 
differences for the Negative Affect scores.  
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Grammar Test 
As in Experiment 1 and 2, the group means were submitted to a one-way between-
subjects ANOVA. For all analyses, an alpha level of 0.05 was used to determine statistical 
significance. The test indicated that overall, mood did not have a significant effect on grammar 
test scores F(3, 196) = 1.907, MSE = 0.078, p = 0.130, η 
2
=
 
0.028 (see Figures 18 and 19 for 
means and spread). However, an independent t- test was conducted to compare the highest 
scoring group (negative) to the lowest (positive-high arousal) and found that the scores were 
marginally significantly different, t(98) = 1.953, SE = 0.020, p = 0.054. 
As in Experiment 1 and 2, hit rate, miss rate, false alarm rate, correction rejection rate, 
sensitivity (d’), and criterion (c) were computed and are shown in Tables 8 and 9. For the correct 
and consistent items, there were no differences for all six signal detection measures, as revealed 
by between-subjects ANOVAs (all p’s > 0.05).  
AHS 
 As in Experiment 2, group means were computed for the four subdomains of the 
Analysis-Holism Scale and were submitted to a between subjects repeated ANOVA. There was a 
main effect of Analysis-Holism subdomain, F(3, 196) = 26.181, p < 0.001, ηp 
2 
= 0.118, 
indicating that mean scores on the four different subscales were statistically significant from one 
another. There was not a significant main effect of mood, F(3, 196) = 0.868, MSE = 34.035, p = 
0.459, ηp
2
 = 0.989. Finally, the interaction of AHS subdomains and mood was also not 
significant, F(3, 196) = 0.389, MSE = 9.789, p = 0.761, ηp
2
 = 0.006. 
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Discussion 
 Experiment 3 investigated the possibility that mood inducing images that represented a 
category would influence implicit learning. It was expected that the same trend of results from 
Experiment 2 would be magnified, but this hypothesis was not supported. The negative and 
positive-high arousal groups were marginally significant from each other, but no other 
differences were observed. In essence, because the negative group was assumed to be high 
arousal, the two high arousal groups were the only groups that differed. However, arousal studies 
have shown that arousal can be beneficial up until a point but then becomes detrimental (Lupien 
et al., 1997; Yerkes & Dodson, 1908). Therefore, it is possible that the level of arousal in the 
negative mood condition was beneficial but the level and / or type of arousal in the positive-high 
arousal condition was detrimental.  
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CHAPTER 8 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Four experiments were conducted to examine the relationship between mood and implicit 
learning. A pilot experiment was used to make sure that this was an area worth pursing 
dissertation work. It was found that positive mood participants outperformed negative mood 
participants when the mood induction task was also the implicit learning phase. The positive 
mood condition performed better with both a simple and complex grammar. However, the results 
contradicted the only prior study that had investigated artificial grammar learning and mood 
(Pretz et al., 2010).  
The goal of Experiment 1 was to replicate the Pretz et al. (2010) study, which showed 
that those in a negative mood performed better on an artificial grammar learning task. 
Participants saw mood inducing images before being presented with letter sequences to 
memorize, and were then given a grammar test. In contrast to the pilot experiment, the 
Experiment 1 results replicated the basic trend that was observed by Pretz et al., but the effect 
was not as large (as is common in many replication studies). The results support the fact that the 
Pretz et al. (2010) findings were not an anomaly and it appears that when participants are given a 
separate mood test and then an artificial grammar task, those in a negative mood have a slight 
advantage.  
Experiment 2 was an expansion of the pilot study. The procedure was very similar except 
that the images used came from the IAPS; also, two additional mood groups were added 
(positive-high arousal and neutral). The Experiment 2 results showed the same trend as the pilot 
experiment, with the positive-low arousal group outperforming the negative mood group, but this 
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pattern in Experiment 2 was not statistically significant. It is unclear why the positive-low 
arousal group did not score as high as the positive group in the pilot experiment, but perhaps the 
mixed arousal pictures in the pilot lead to higher scores. However, the lack of significance could 
also be due to type II error or lack of power.  
One question that remains is why Experiment 2 produced different results than 
Experiment 1. One possibility is that the same pictures being shown repeatedly could make the 
stimuli less surprising, which is known to decrease memory performance (e.g., Marchewka et al., 
2016). Another possibility is that the integral nature of the task, as was used in Experiment 2, 
impacts implicit learning differently. As a reminder, integral tasks refers to when the stimuli to 
be learned or remembered is mood inducting, whereas, when the stimuli are unrelated, it is 
referred to as incidental which is more common in mood research (e.g., Blanchette & Richards, 
2010) and what was used in Experiment 1 (Experiment 3 was integral but not as integral as 
Experiment 2).  
Experiment 3 examined the effect of mood on implicit learning when the artificial 
grammar task was based on categories. The design of this experiment has the most ecological 
validity as it is more common to encounter different instances of mood inducing stimuli in our 
environments. The Experiment 3 results showed that all groups learned the underlying grammar; 
however, the mood differences were somewhat small or not present. That is, the only groups that 
were marginally significant were the negative (high arousal) and positive-high arousal groups. 
One possible explanation is that the positive-high arousal group viewed images that were the 
most approach motivated, meaning that they may have had the strongest urge to approach an 
object (e.g., Gable & Harmon-Jones, 2008). As discussed in the introduction, approached 
motivated stimuli elicit an action (e.g., a picture of cupcakes making someone want to get ice 
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cream), which is known to reduce the breadth of focus (e.g., Gable & Harmon-Jones, 2008) as 
opposed to stimuli that are not as approach motivated (e.g., pictures of cute puppies). This is the 
first study (to my knowledge) to show that category learning can be achieved with an artificial 
grammar learning paradigm; it was demonstrated with a statistical learning paradigm (Brady & 
Olivia, 2008) but, as discussed in the introduction, statistical learning is based on a much simpler 
algorithm.  
Affect-As-Information Hypothesis 
Given the pilot experiment results and the numerous studies (for a review, see Clore & 
Huntsinger, 2007) supporting the affect-as-information hypothesis, I had predicted for 
Experiments 1, 2, and 3 that those in a positive mood would perform better on the artificial 
grammar learning test. However, all three experiments produced results that were not consistent 
with the affect-as-information hypothesis. Experiment 1 did not necessarily contradict the 
hypothesis because it makes predictions pertaining to differences between positive versus 
negative mood, and the significant effect in Experiment 1 was driven by differences between the 
negative and neutral group. Experiment 2 did not find differences so it is neither supporting nor 
aligning to the affect-as-information hypothesis. However, Experiment 3 somewhat conflicts 
with the affect-as-information hypothesis with the negative group performing the best and the 
positive high arousal group performing the worst.  
These findings lead to the question as whether the affect-as-information hypothesis 
applies to all of the implicit learning scenarios explored in this dissertation. One possibility is 
that, because implicit learning is different than explicit learning, mood does not affect it in the 
same way. For instance, it is debated (e.g., Perruchet & Pacteau, 1990) whether artificial 
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grammar learning relies more on learning small chunks or learning more broad rules. 
Experiments 1 and 3 suggest that implicit learning is more dependent on learning smaller 
chunks, thus, giving those in a negative mood an advantage. Therefore, the affect-as-information 
hypothesis may not be incorrect, but it might not apply to non-declarative learning processes. In 
a similar vein, perhaps mood in general does not have that much bearing on implicit processes 
given the null results of Experiment 2 and the small effect sizes in the other experiments. This 
would also be in line with those who have posited that implicit learning is more resistant to 
individual differences due to being an evolutionary old ability (e.g., Reber, 1993). 
The inclusion of arousal could also contribute to the results not being in perfect alignment 
with the affect-as-information hypothesis. Many studies only look at valence, and arousal is not 
studied as much despite it being important to how events are perceived and to other types of 
cognitive processing (e.g., Ochsner, 2000). Some studies have found that arousal is only 
beneficial to memory up to a certain point and then it becomes detrimental (Lupien et al., 1997; 
Yerkes & Dodson, 1908). This is consistent with what was found in Experiment 3 and possibly 
Experiment 1. 
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CHAPTER 9 
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
One limitation in these experiments was that the mood induction / viewing phase was 
rather long at approximately 30 minutes. Mood inductions are very transient (Westermann et al., 
1996) so it is possible that it wore off in some cases. There is some evidence for this, because 
comparisons of the post to pre PANAS for the positive scores showed smaller effects for the 
former. This was a trade-off, however, as a longer viewing phase was administered to ensure that 
participants could learn the pattern at levels well above chance. Future studies can manipulate 
the number of learning trials presented to achieve a better mood / learning balance.  
Another possible limitation is attention allocation. Attention is a known factor that affects 
implicit learning (e.g., Patterson et al., 2013). In the case of this dissertation, the learning task 
was also the mood induction, which made attention to the learning materials doubly critical. It is 
possible that certain mood groups could have allocated varying amounts of attention. For 
example, perhaps the slightly erotic images in Experiment 3 made participants uncomfortable 
and not as likely to focus their attention. Bennion, Ford, Murray, and Kensinger (2013) 
recommend using eye gaze as a covariate to account for attention; future studies exploring 
implicit learning in relation to mood and arousal could use eye tracking to ensure that all groups 
are allocating equal amounts of attention.  
Because it remains unclear as to whether a more broad or narrow focus benefits implicit 
learning, those processes could be more directly studied with an artificial grammar task that 
contains letters that are composed of smaller and different letters, as was employed in the 
Kiyokawa et al. (2012) study that examined cultural differences and implicit learning. Of course, 
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the mood manipulation would have to be separate as in Experiment 1, which could be another 
variable that influences the relationship between mood and implicit learning.  
In my opinion, future experiments should continue to investigate the complicated 
relationship between mood, arousal, and implicit learning as the experiments in this dissertation 
just scratched the surface of this issue. In addition to incorporating factors that could influence 
mood (as mentioned above), it would also be useful to examine some of the factors that influence 
implicit learning such as transfer. Pictures could be presented for the viewing phase and then 
participants could be tested on only letters at test; however, it is possible because the testing 
stimuli would not contain mood inducing stimuli, that mood could wear off. To address this 
possibility, the targeted mood state could be emphasized with music or stories presented aurally 
during the testing phase.  
As mentioned previously, attention can influence implicit learning and only a small 
amount of attention is required for learning to occur (e.g., Saffran et al., 1997). Because large 
amounts of attention are not required for implicit learning, future studies can examine how mood 
interacts with divided attention. Although, it should be kept in mind that making a task more 
difficult is known to make a positive mood group less positive (e.g., Braverman, 2005 ). In this 
case, with a relatively easy and somewhat mundane task of viewing pictures for several minutes, 
maybe an additional task such as articulatory suppression would actually make the task more 
appealing.  
This dissertation may be the first step in having real world implications for those who 
work in jobs involving implicit learning in emotional situations. For example, military analysts 
often work in high pressure situations where they are watching surveillance feeds with the goal 
64 
 
to identify suspicious activities. Therefore, an analyst has to be proficient at picking up on the 
regularities in their environment so they can detect the anomalies (e.g., an IED hidden under 
clothing). Experiment 3 most resembles real life situations because analysts are more likely to 
see different objects from the same categories, rather than repetitions of the exact same objects. 
The results from Experiment 3 would suggest that a more negative or neutral mood state would 
be beneficial to detecting anomalies. This will of course have to be corroborated with further 
studies, but if this finding holds up, it will be useful for analysts to know that witnessing 
harrowing sights such as victims of war will not impair their ability to perform their job.  
As stated earlier, the patterns observed across the three main experiments did not fit 
perfectly with the affect-as-information hypothesis. Any, or all, of the possibilities described 
above could be explored to gain a better understanding of how mood and arousal influence 
implicit learning. These possibilities should be explored so that the complex relationship can be 
more fully understood. Once this is achieved, the result can be applied be shared with those who 
have to rely on implicit processes at their jobs, such as military analysts.  
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CHAPTER 11 
CONCLUSION 
 In summary, three experiments, plus a pilot experiment, examined mood and implicit 
learning. The mood groups in all four experiments performed at above chance levels on the 
grammar tests. Unfortunately, like the previous studies conducted (e.g., Bertels et al., 2013; Pretz 
et al., 2010; Shang et al., 2013), the pattern of mood was not clear cut. The affect-as-information 
hypothesis was not observed, as there was a slight benefit for those in a negative mood in two of 
the experiments. However, the experiments did show that people were able to learn implicitly 
when the stimuli were mood inducing. Moreover, people were also able to implicitly learn 
categories. This dissertation added to the few studies (Bertels et al., 2013; Braverman, 2005; 
Pretz et al., 2010; Rathus et al, 1994; Shang et al., 2013) that have investigated the relationship 
between mood and implicit learning. The findings suggest that mood impacts implicit learning 
differently than explicit learning. It is recommended that the differences between implicit and 
explicit learning, and how both mood and arousal influences both types of learning, should be 
continued to be investigated in future research.  
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APPENDIX A: FIGURES 
 
Figure 1. Transition diagram adapted from Reber (1967). 
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Figure 2. Self-Assessment Manikin adapted from Lang (1980). 
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Figure 3. Modified Reber and Allen (1978) state diagram used to generate the complex grammar 
in the pilot experiment. 
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Figure 4. Positive condition for the simple grammar in the pilot study.  
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Figure 5. Negative condition for the simple grammar in pilot study. 
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Figure 6. State diagram used to generate the complex pictures sequences for the positive mood 
condition in the pilot study. 
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Figure 7. State diagram used to generate the complex pictures sequences for the negative mood 
condition in the pilot study. 
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Figure 8. Mean accuracy scores for the positive and negative mood groups with the simple and 
complex grammars in the pilot experiment. The error bars reflect standard error.  
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Figure 9. PANAS graph for Experiment 1. PANAS were collected after the mood induction. The 
error bars reflect standard error. 
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Figure 10. Mean accuracy scores for the different mood groups on the grammar test in 
Experiment 1. The error bars reflect standard error. 
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Figure 11. Boxplots of the accuracy data for Experiment 1. 
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Figure 12. Mean accuracy scores for the different mood groups on the grammar test in 
Experiment 2. The error bars reflect standard error. 
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Figure 13. Boxplots for the accuracy data in Experiment 2. 
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Figure 14. State diagram example for the positive-high arousal condition in Experiment 3. 
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Figure 15. State diagram example for the positive-low arousal condition in Experiment 3. 
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Figure 16. State diagram example for the negative condition in Experiment 3. 
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Figure 17. State diagram example for the neutral condition in Experiment 3. 
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Figure 18. Mean accuracy scores for the different mood groups on the grammar test in 
Experiment 3. The error bars reflect standard error. 
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Figure 19. Boxplots for the accuracy data in Experiment 3. 
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APPENDIX B: PILOT IMAGES 
Positive Images
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Negative Images
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APPENDIX C: PANAS 
Positive Affect Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS) 
The following 20 items describe the different types of feelings that may be experienced by a 
person. For each item, use the 5 point scale to rate how you are CURRENTLY feeling. 
Interested 
           1                                            2                        3                            4                          5 
Very slightly or not at all             a little            moderately             quite a bit             extremely 
 
Excited 
           1                                            2                        3                            4                          5 
Very slightly or not at all             a little            moderately             quite a bit             extremely 
 
Strong 
           1                                            2                        3                            4                          5 
Very slightly or not at all             a little            moderately             quite a bit             extremely 
 
Enthusiastic 
           1                                            2                        3                            4                          5 
Very slightly or not at all             a little            moderately             quite a bit             extremely 
 
Proud 
           1                                            2                        3                            4                          5 
Very slightly or not at all             a little            moderately             quite a bit             extremely 
 
Alert 
           1                                            2                        3                            4                          5 
Very slightly or not at all             a little            moderately             quite a bit             extremely 
 
Inspired 
           1                                            2                        3                            4                          5 
Very slightly or not at all             a little            moderately             quite a bit             extremely 
 
Determined 
           1                                            2                        3                            4                          5 
Very slightly or not at all             a little            moderately             quite a bit             extremely 
 
Attentive 
           1                                            2                        3                            4                          5 
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Very slightly or not at all             a little            moderately             quite a bit             extremely 
 
Active 
           1                                            2                        3                            4                          5 
Very slightly or not at all             a little            moderately             quite a bit             extremely 
 
Upset 
           1                                            2                        3                            4                          5 
Very slightly or not at all             a little            moderately             quite a bit             extremely 
 
Guilty 
           1                                            2                        3                            4                          5 
Very slightly or not at all             a little            moderately             quite a bit             extremely 
 
Scared 
           1                                            2                        3                            4                          5 
Very slightly or not at all             a little            moderately             quite a bit             extremely 
 
Hostile 
           1                                            2                        3                            4                          5 
Very slightly or not at all             a little            moderately             quite a bit             extremely 
 
Irritable 
           1                                            2                        3                            4                          5 
Very slightly or not at all             a little            moderately             quite a bit             extremely 
 
Ashamed 
           1                                            2                        3                            4                          5 
Very slightly or not at all             a little            moderately             quite a bit             extremely 
 
Nervous 
           1                                            2                        3                            4                          5 
Very slightly or not at all             a little            moderately             quite a bit             extremely 
 
Jittery 
           1                                            2                        3                            4                          5 
Very slightly or not at all             a little            moderately             quite a bit             extremely 
 
Afraid 
           1                                            2                        3                            4                          5 
Very slightly or not at all             a little            moderately             quite a bit             extremely 
 
Distressed 
           1                                            2                        3                            4                          5 
Very slightly or not at all             a little            moderately             quite a bit             extremely 
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APPENDIX D: PILOT GRAMMAR 
Simple Condition 
The letter sequences that were matched to mood inducing images in the simple condition of the 
pilot, as well as Experiments 2- 3. The algorithm was derived for the Reber (1967) grammar. The 
correct sequences were presented during the training phase. The correct, consistent, and foils 
were used during test.  
Correct 
VXVS 
TPTS 
VXVPS 
TTXVS 
VVPXVS 
VXXXVPS 
VXVPXVS 
TPPPPPTS 
VVPXXVPS 
TTXVPXVS 
VXXXXVPS 
TTXXXVPS 
VVPS 
TPPPTS 
VVPXXVS 
TPTXXVPS 
TPTXXXVS 
VXXXXVS 
TPPTXXVS 
VXXXXXVS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Consistent 
VXXVS 
TPPTS 
TTXXVS 
VXXXVS 
TTXVPS 
VXXVPS 
TPTXVS 
VVPXVPS 
TPPTXVS 
TTXXVPS 
TTXXXVS 
TPTXXVS 
TPTXVPS 
TPPPPTS 
VXXVPXVS 
TTXXXXVS 
TPPPTXVS 
TPPTXVPS 
VXVPXXVS 
VXVPXVPS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Foils 
VTPS 
TVXS 
TXPPS 
VTPXS 
VTTTPS 
TVXPPS 
VTTPXS 
TXPPXS 
TXPTTPS 
VPXPTPS 
TVVXPPS 
TXPTPXS 
VPXPPXS 
TVVXPPXS 
VTTTTPXS 
VPXPTPXS 
VTPXPTPS 
VPXPTTPS 
TVVVXPPS 
TXPTTPXS
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Complex Condition 
Material set for the complex condition in the pilot experiment. The letter sequences below were 
matched with the corresponding pictures in Figure 5 and Figure 6. The correct sequences were 
presented during the training phase. The correct, consistent, and foils were used during test. 
Correct 
MTVS 
VXVS 
MTVTS 
MVRXS 
VXRXVS 
MTTTVS 
VXTVRXS 
VXTTVTS 
MTTTTVTS 
VXRXTTVS 
VXTVRXMS 
MVRXVRXS 
VXRXTTTVS 
VXVRXTVTS 
VXTVRXRXS 
VXRXVRXVS 
MTTVRXRXS 
MTTTTTTVS 
VXRXRXRXS 
VXVRXTTVS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Consistent 
MVTS 
VXTVS 
VXTVTS 
MVRXMS 
VXRXMS 
VXVRXS 
MTVRXS 
MVRXVTS 
VXTTTVS 
MVRXRXS 
VXRXRXVS 
MTTTTTVS 
VXTVRXVS 
MVRXRXMS 
VXRXVRXS 
MTTTTTVTS 
VXRXVRXMS 
MVRXRXRXS 
VXRXTTVTS 
MTTTTVRXS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Foils  
MRVS 
VRTS 
VTRS 
MXRVS 
MRXRTS 
MXXXRVS 
MRXTXRS 
MRXTRVS 
MXXRXRS 
VTXXRVS 
VTRXRTS 
VTXRXRS 
VRMRMRS 
MXXXXRVS 
MXRXTXRVS 
MRXTXRXRS 
MRXTRXRTS 
VTXXRXTRS 
VRMRMTRVS 
VRMRMTXRS 
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APPENDIX E: EXPERIMENT 1 GRAMMAR 
The letter sequences used in Experiment 1, which were generated by the Reber (1967) state 
diagram. Participants were asked to memorize the correct-presented sequences. The correct-test, 
consistent, and foils were used at test.
Correct- Presented 
VXVS 
TPTS 
VXVPS 
TTXVS 
VVPXVS 
VXXXVPS 
VXVPXVS 
TPPPPPTS 
VVPXXVPS 
TTXVPXVS 
VXXXXVPS 
TTXXXVPS 
VVPS 
TPPPTS 
VVPXXVS 
TPTXXVPS 
TPTXXXVS 
VXXXXVS 
TPPTXXVS 
VXXXXXVS 
 
 
 
 
Test - Correct 
VXVS 
TTXVS 
VXVPXVS 
TTXVPXVS 
VXXXXVPS 
TPPPTS 
VXXXXVS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Test- Consistent 
VXXVS 
TPPTS 
TTXXVS 
VXXXVS 
TTXVPS 
VXXVPS 
TPTXVS 
VVPXVPS 
TPPTXVS 
TTXXVPS 
TTXXXVS 
TPTXXVS 
TPTXVPS 
TPPPPTS 
VXXVPXVS 
TTXXXXVS 
TPPPTXVS 
TPPTXVPS 
VXVPXVPS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Test - Foils 
VTPS 
VPXS 
TVXS 
TVVXS 
VTTTPS 
TVVVXS 
TVXPPS 
VPXPPS 
TVXPPXS 
VPXPTPS 
TVVXPPS 
TVXPTPS 
TXPTPXS 
VPXPPXS 
VTPXPPS 
VTTTTPS 
TVVVVVXS 
TVVXPPXS 
TXPTTTPS 
VTTTTTPS 
TXPPXPPS 
TVVVXPPS 
TVVXPTPS 
VTTPXPPS 
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APPENDIX F: EXPERIMENT 1 IAPS RATINGS 
IAPS numbers, valence ratings, and arousal ratings for the images used in Experiment 1. 
Title IAPS # Valence M Arousal M 
Positive Mood Condition 
Kitten 1460 8.21 (1.21) 4.31 (2.63) 
Puppies 1710 8.34 (1.12) 5.41 (2.34) 
Baby 2045 7.87 (1.19) 5.47 (2.34) 
Baby 2070 8.17 (1.46) 4.51 (2.74) 
Boy 2391 7.11 (1.77) 4.63 (2.43 
Mother 2311 7.54 (1.37) 4.42 (2.28) 
Couple 2530 7.8 (1.55) 3.99 (2.11) 
Wedding 4626 7.6 (1.66) 5.78 (2.42) 
Seaside 5210 8.03 (1.09) 4.6 (2.48) 
Sea 5825 8.03 (1.18) 5.46 (2.72) 
Mountains 5600 7.57 (1.48) 5.19 (2.70) 
Mountains 5700 7.61 (1.46) 5.68 (2.33) 
Garden 5202 7.25 (1.44) 3.73 (2.22) 
Nature 5201 7.06 (1.71) 3.83 (2.49) 
Fireworks 5910 7.8 (1.23) 5.59 (2.55) 
Castle 7502 7.75 (1.40) 5.91 (2.31) 
Money 8501 7.91 (1.66) 6.44 (2.29) 
Money 8502 7.51 (1.72) 5.78 (2.49) 
HappyTeens 8461 7.22 (1.53) 4.69 (2.20) 
Kids 2387 7.12 (1.58) 3.97 (2.18) 
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Seal 1440 8.19 (1.53) 4.61 (2.54) 
PolarBears 1441 7.97 (1.28) 3.94 (2.38) 
Baby 2071 7.86 (1.32) 5.00 (2.34) 
Father 2057 7.81 (1.28) 4.54 (2.41) 
Family 2395 7.49 (1.69) 4.19 (2.40) 
Kids 2388 7.44 (1.44) 3.77 (2.21) 
Romance 4622 7.46 (1.61) 4.11 (2.30) 
Couple 2550 7.77 (1.43) 4.68 (2.43) 
Romance 4623 7.13 (1.80) 5.44 (2.23) 
Romance 4599 7.12 (1.48) 5.69 (1.94) 
Courtyard 5779 7.33 (1.42) 3.57 (2.30) 
Flowers 5811 7.23 (1.60) 3.30 (2.33) 
Fireworks 5480 7.53 (1.63) 5.48 (2.35) 
Money 8503 7.02 (1.71) 5.22 (2.59) 
Children 2345 7.41 (1.72) 5.42 (2.47) 
Boys 2224 7.24 (1.58) 4.85 (2.11) 
Beach 5833 8.22 (1.08) 5.71 (2.66) 
Nature 5780 7.52 (1.45) 3.75 (2.54) 
Mountains 5660 7.27 (1.59) 5.07 (2.62) 
Mountains 5631 7.29 (1.34) 3.86 (2.64) 
Bunnies 1750 8.28 (1.07) 4.1 (2.31) 
Monkeys 1811 7.62 (1.59) 5.12 (2.25) 
Porpoise 1920 7.9 (1.48) 4.27 (2.53) 
Jaguars 1722 7.04 (2.02) 5.22 (2.49) 
Rafters 8400 7.09 (1.52) 6.61 (1.86) 
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Skydivers 8185 7.57 (1.52) 7.27 (2.08) 
Waterskier 8200 7.54 (1.37) 6.35 (1.98) 
Rollercoaster 8492 7.21 (2.26) 7.31 (1.64) 
Sunset 5829 7.65 (1.42) 4.68 (2.45) 
Sunset 5830 8.00 (1.48) 4.92 (2.65) 
Neutral Mood Condition 
Chess 2840 4.91 (1.52) 2.43 (1.82) 
Woman 2400 4.21 (1.34) 4.2 (2.10) 
Crochet 7513 5.45 (1.40) 3.47 (2.02) 
Woman 2026 4.82 (0.95) 3.4 (1.84) 
Boy 2410 4.62 (1.72) 4.13 (2.29) 
Girl 2411 5.07 (0.85) 2.86 (1.84) 
Golf 8312 5.37 (1.41) 3.32 (2.06) 
Golfer 8311 5.88 (1.67) 3.57 (2.35) 
Reading 2377 5.19 (1.31) 3.50 (1.95) 
Bakers 2579 5.53 (1.35) 3.85 (2.00) 
Chess 2580 5.71 (1.41) 2.79 (1.78) 
Sailboat 8211 5.76 (1.89) 5.36 (2.35) 
Secretary 2383 4.72 (1.36) 3.41 (1.83) 
Shopping 2745.1 5.31 (1.08) 3.26 (1.96) 
Farmer 2191 5.30 (1.62) 3.61 (2.14) 
Airplane 7632 5.22 (1.69) 4.78 (2.36) 
Couple 2396 4.91 (1.05) 3.34 (1.83) 
Baskets 7041 4.99 (1.12) 2.60 (1.78) 
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Puzzle 7061 5.40 (1.40) 3.66 (1.92) 
FireHydrant 7100 5.24 (1.20) 2.89 (1.70) 
Stove 7077 5.12 (1.46) 4.61 (2.06) 
Tissue 7950 4.94 (1.21) 2.28 (1.81) 
AbstractArt 7185 4.97 (0.87) 2.64 (2.04) 
Cabinet 7705 4.77 (1.02) 2.65 (1.88) 
Chair 7235 4.96 (1.18) 2.83 (2.00) 
Outlet 6150 5.08 (1.17) 3.22 (2.02) 
Stool 7025 4.63 (1.17) 2.71 (2.20) 
Lamp 7175 4.87 (1.00) 1.72 (1.26) 
Umbrella 7150 4.72 (1.00) 2.61 (1.76) 
FileCabinets 7224 4.45 (1.36) 2.81 (1.94) 
Clock 7211 4.81 (1.78) 4.2 (2.40) 
Plate 7233 5.09 (1.46) 2.77 (1.92) 
IroningBoard 7234 4.23 (1.58) 2.96 (1.90) 
Pig 1350 5.25 (1.96) 4.37 (1.76) 
DogRace 1505 4.13 (1.66) 4.73 (1.83) 
Bees 1390 4.50 (1.56) 5.29 (1.97) 
Gannet 1450 6.37 (1.62) 2.83 (1.87 
Buffalo 1675 5.24 (1.48) 4.37 (2.15) 
Jellyfish 1908 5.28 (1.53) 4.88 (2.15) 
Bridge 7546 5.4 (1.13) 3.72 (2.16) 
Bridge 7547 5.21 (0.96) 3.18 (2.01) 
Stairs 7504 5.67 (1.46) 4.25 (2.27) 
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Building 7500 5.33 (1.44) 3.26 (2.18) 
Store 7495 5.90 (1.60) 3.82 (2.33) 
Building 7491 4.82 (1.03) 2.39 (1.90) 
Shipyard 7036 4.88 (1.08) 3.32 (2.04) 
Trains 7037 4.81 (1.12) 3.71 (2.08) 
Satellite 5471 5.21 (1.18) 3.26 (2.05) 
Traffic 7590 4.75 (1.55) 3.80 (2.13) 
Freeway 7560 4.47 (1.65) 5.24 (2.03) 
Negative Mood Condition 
Hospital 2205 1.95 (1.58) 4.53 (2.23) 
Funeral 2799 2.42 (1.41) 5.02 (1.99) 
Cemetery 9220 2.06 (1.54) 4.00 (2.09) 
GrievingFem 2141 2.44 (1.64) 5.00 (2.03) 
Baby 2053 2.47 (1.87) 5.25 (2.46) 
BlackEye 2345.1 2.26 (1.46) 5.50 (2.43) 
StarvingChild 9075 1.66 (1.10) 6.04 (2.40) 
Toddler 2095 1.79 (1.18) 5.25 (2.34) 
InjuredDog 9184 2.47 (1.52) 5.75 (2.43) 
HurtDog 9183 1.69 (1.10) 6.58 (2.12) 
InjuredDog 9187 1.81 (1.36) 6.45 (2.30) 
SickKitty 9561 2.68 (1.92) 4.79 (2.29) 
Garbage 9290 2.88 (1.52) 4.40 (2.11) 
Garbage 9291 2.93 (1.19) 4.38 (2.05) 
Garbage 9340 2.41 (1.48) 5.16 (2.35) 
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Garbage 9295 2.39 (1.30) 5.11 (2.05) 
Soldier 9421 2.21 (1.45) 5.04 (2.15) 
Soldier 9420 2.31 (1.59) 5.69 (2.28) 
Bomb 9424 2.87 (1.62) 5.78 (2.12) 
Assault 9427 2.89 (1.47) 5.50 (2.09) 
CarAccident 9900 2.46 (1.39) 5.58 (2.13) 
CarAccident 9901 2.27 (1.25) 5.70 (2.22) 
CarAccident 9908 2.34 (1.49) 6.63 (2.13) 
CarAccident 9910 2.06 (1.26) 6.2 (2.16) 
Fire 9921 2.04 (1.47) 6.52 (1.94) 
Flood 9927 2.71 (1.56) 5.29 (1.91) 
Explosion 9940 1.62 (1.20) 7.15 (2.24) 
PlaneCrash 9050 2.43 (1.61) 6.36 (1.97) 
DrugAddict 2710 2.52 (1.69) 5.46 (2.29) 
DrunkDriving 2751 2.67 (1.87) 5.18 (2.39) 
Cigarette 9831 2.95 (1.72) 4.61 (2.34) 
Needles 9007 2.49 (1.41) 5.03 (2.32) 
CryingBoy 2900.1 2.56 (1.41) 4.61 (2.07) 
Girl 2276 2.67 (1.66) 4.63 (1.93) 
KidCry 2301 2.78 (1.38) 4.57 (1.96) 
ScaredChild 9041 2.98 (1.58) 4.64 (2.26) 
Attack 6563 1.77 (1.23) 6.85 (2.18) 
AimedGun 6250 2.83 (1.79) 6.54 (2.61) 
AimedGun 6200 2.71 (1.58) 6.21 (2.28) 
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AimedGun 6243 2.33 (1.49) 5.99 (2.23) 
Abduction 6312 2.48 (1.52) 6.37 (2.30) 
BeatenFem 6315 2.31 (1.69) 6.38 (2.39) 
Attack 6360 2.23 (1.73) 6.33 (2.51) 
Attack 6530 2.76 (1.86) 6.18 (2.02) 
Hospital 3220 2.49 (1.29) 5.52 (1.86) 
DyingMan 3230 2.02 (1.30) 5.41 (2.21) 
BurnVictim 3215 2.51 (1.32) 5.44 (2.16) 
Surgery 3213 2.96 (1.94) 6.82 (2.00) 
KKKrally 9810 2.09 (1.78) 6.62 (2.26) 
Skinhead 9800 2.04 (1.57) 6.05 (2.71) 
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APPENDIX G: AHS 
Analytic Holism Scale (AHS)  
The next set of questions will ask about your beliefs. Please rate items on a 7 point scale, with 1 
= strongly disagree and 7 = strongly agree. 
 
Everything in the universe is somehow related to each other. 
     1                        2                      3                     4                    5                      6                     7 
Strongly disagree                                                                                                         strongly agree 
 
Nothing is unrelated. 
     1                        2                      3                     4                    5                      6                     7 
Strongly disagree                                                                                                         strongly agree 
 
Everything in the world is intertwined in a causal relationship. 
     1                        2                      3                     4                    5                      6                     7 
Strongly disagree                                                                                                         strongly agree 
 
Even a small change in any element of the universe can lead to significant alternations in other 
elements. 
     1                        2                      3                     4                    5                      6                     7 
Strongly disagree                                                                                                         strongly agree 
 
Any phenomenon has numerous number of causes, although some of the cause are not known. 
     1                        2                      3                     4                    5                      6                     7 
Strongly disagree                                                                                                         strongly agree 
 
Any phenomenon entails a numerous number of consequences, although some of them may not 
be known. 
     1                        2                      3                     4                    5                      6                     7 
Strongly disagree                                                                                                         strongly agree 
 
It is more desirable to take the middle ground than go to extremes. 
     1                        2                      3                     4                    5                      6                     7 
Strongly disagree                                                                                                         strongly agree 
 
When disagreement exists among people, they should search for ways to compromise and 
embrace everyone's opinions. 
     1                        2                      3                     4                    5                      6                     7 
Strongly disagree                                                                                                         strongly agree 
 
It is more important to find a point of compromise than to debate who is right / wrong, when 
one's opinions conflict with other's opinions. 
     1                        2                      3                     4                    5                      6                     7 
Strongly disagree                                                                                                         strongly agree 
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It is desirable to be in harmony, rather than in discord, with others of different opinions than 
one's own. 
     1                        2                      3                     4                    5                      6                     7 
Strongly disagree                                                                                                         strongly agree 
 
Choosing a middle ground in an argument should be avoided. 
     1                        2                      3                     4                    5                      6                     7 
Strongly disagree                                                                                                         strongly agree 
 
We should avoid going to extremes 
     1                        2                      3                     4                    5                      6                     7 
Strongly disagree                                                                                                         strongly agree 
 
Every phenomenon in the world moves in predictable directions. 
     1                        2                      3                     4                    5                      6                     7 
Strongly disagree                                                                                                         strongly agree 
 
A person who is currently living a successful life will continue to stay successful 
     1                        2                      3                     4                    5                      6                     7 
Strongly disagree                                                                                                         strongly agree 
 
An individual who is currently honest will stay honest in the future. 
     1                        2                      3                     4                    5                      6                     7 
Strongly disagree                                                                                                         strongly agree 
 
If an event is moving toward a certain direction, it will continue to move toward that direction. 
     1                        2                      3                     4                    5                      6                     7 
Strongly disagree                                                                                                         strongly agree 
 
Current situations can change at any time. 
     1                        2                      3                     4                    5                      6                     7 
Strongly disagree                                                                                                         strongly agree 
 
Future events are predictable based on present situations. 
     1                        2                      3                     4                    5                      6                     7 
Strongly disagree                                                                                                         strongly agree 
 
The whole, rather than its parts, should be considered in order to understand a phenomenon. 
     1                        2                      3                     4                    5                      6                     7 
Strongly disagree                                                                                                         strongly agree 
 
It is more important to pay attention to the whole than its parts 
     1                        2                      3                     4                    5                      6                     7 
Strongly disagree                                                                                                         strongly agree 
 
The whole is greater than the sums of its parts. 
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     1                        2                      3                     4                    5                      6                     7 
Strongly disagree                                                                                                         strongly agree 
 
It is more important to pay attention to the whole context rather than the details. 
     1                        2                      3                     4                    5                      6                     7 
Strongly disagree                                                                                                         strongly agree 
 
It is not possible to understand the parts without considering the whole picture. 
     1                        2                      3                     4                    5                      6                     7 
Strongly disagree                                                                                                         strongly agree 
 
We should consider the situation on a person is faced with, as well as his / her personality, in 
order to understand one's behavior. 
     1                        2                      3                     4                    5                      6                     7 
Strongly disagree                                                                                                         strongly agree 
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APPENDIX H: EXPERIMENT 2 IAPS RATINGS 
The IAPS title, number, mean valence, and mean arousal for the images used in Experiment 2.  
Title IAPS # Valence M Arousal M 
Positive-High Arousal 
Erotic Couple 4607 7.03 (1.84) 6.34 (2.16) 
Erotic Couple 4608 7.07 (1.66) 6.47 (1.96) 
Erotic Couple 4660 7.40 (1.36) 6.58 (1.88) 
Erotic Couple 4680 7.25 (1.83) 6.02 (2.27) 
Waterfall 5260 7.34 (1.74) 5.71 (2.53) 
Astronaut 5470 7.35 (1.62) 6.02 (2.26) 
Fireworks 5480 7.53 (1.63) 5.48 (2.35) 
Sky Divers 5621 7.57 (1.42) 6.99 (1.95) 
Wind Surfers 5623 7.19 (1.44) 5.67 (2.32) 
Hiker 5629 7.03 (1.55) 6.55 (2.11) 
Mountains 5700 7.61 (1.46) 5.68 (2.33) 
Beach 5833 8.22 (1.08) 5.71 (2.66) 
Turkey 7230 7.38 (1.65) 5.52 (2.32) 
Ice Cream 7270 7.53 (1.73) 5.76 (2.21) 
Cupcakes 7405 7.38 (1.73) 6.28 (2.16) 
Skier 8034 7.06 (1.53) 6.30 (2.16) 
Parachute 8163 7.14 (1.61) 6.53 (2.21) 
Cliff Divers 8180 7.12 (1.88) 6.59 (2.12) 
Roller coaster 8492 7.21 (2.26) 7.31 (1.64) 
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Money 8501 7.91 (1.66) 6.44 (2.29) 
Positive-Low Arousal 
Seal 1440 8.19 (1.53) 4.61 (2.54) 
Polar Bear 1441 7.97 (1.28) 3.94 (2.38) 
Kitten 1460 8.21 (1.47) 4.31 (2.63) 
Bunnies 1750 8.28 (1.07) 4.10 (2.31) 
Father 2057 7.81 (1.28) 4.54 (2.41) 
Neut baby 2260 8.06 (1.42) 4.26 (2.44) 
Mother 2311 7.54 (1.37) 4.42 (2.28) 
Baby 2070 7.69 (1.59) 4.02 (2.30) 
Kids 2388 7.44 (1.44)) 3.77 (2.21) 
Couple 2530 7.80 (1.55) 3.99 (2.11) 
Couple 2550 7.77 (1.43) 4.68 (2.43) 
Baby 2660 7.75 (1.48) 4.44 (2.41) 
Romance 4622 7.46 (1.61) 4.11 (2.30) 
Seagulls 5831 7.63 (1.15) 4.43 (2.49) 
Happy Teen 8461 7.22 (1.53)  4.69 (2.20) 
Seaside 5210 8.03 (1.09) 4.60 (2.48) 
Sky 5594 7.39 (1.45) 4.15 (2.76) 
Mountain 5814 7.15 (1.54) 4.82 (2.40) 
Beach 5836 7.25 (1.39) 4.28 (2.41) 
Desert 7580 7.51 (1.60) 4.59 (2.72) 
Neutral 
Pig 1350 5.25(1.96) 4.37 (1.76) 
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Bees 1390 4.50 (1.56) 5.29 (1.97) 
Jellyfish 1908 5.28 (1.53) 4.88 (2.15) 
Man 2002 4.95 (1.36) 3.35 (1.87) 
Neut Face 2200 4.79 (1.38) 3.18 (2.17) 
Reading 2377 5.19 (1.31) 3.50 (1.95) 
Girl 2411 5.10 (0.80) 2.71 (1.74) 
Neutral Male 2493 4.82 (1.27) 3.34 (2.10) 
Chess 2840 4.91 (1.52) 2.43 (1.82) 
Teenager 2870 5.17 (0.94) 2.87 (1.75) 
Satellite 5471 5.21 (1.18) 3.26 (2.05) 
Mushrooms 5532 5.19 (1.69) 3.79 (2.20) 
Outlet 6150 5.08 (1.17) 3.22 (2.02) 
Mug 7009 4.93 (1.00) 3.01 (1.97) 
Shipyard 7036 4.88 (1.08) 3.32 (2.04) 
Lamp 7175 4.87 (1.00) 1.72 (1.26) 
Bridge 7547 5.21 (0.96) 3.18 (2.01) 
Freeway 7560 4.47 (1.65) 5.24 (2.03) 
Rolling Pin 7000 5.25 (1.38) 1.36 (1.10) 
Golf 8312 5.37 (1.41) 3.32 (2.06) 
Negative 
Drug Addict 2717 2.58 (1.32) 5.70 (2.16) 
Mutilation 3150 2.26 (1.57) 6.55 (2.20) 
Infant 3350 1.88 (1.67) 5.72 (2.23) 
Aimed Gun 6230 2.37 (1.57) 7.35 (2.01) 
Attack 6550 2.73 (2.38) 7.09 (1.98) 
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Attack 6560 2.16 (1.41) 6.53 (2.42) 
Suicide 6570 2.19 (1.72) 6.24 (2.16) 
Roach On Pizza 7380 2.46 (1.42) 5.88 (2.44) 
Starving Child 9075 1.66 (1.10) 6.04 (2.40) 
Hurt Dog 9183 1.69 (1.10) 6.58 (2.12) 
Injured Dog 9187 1.81 (1.36) 6.45 (2.30) 
Vomit 9322 2.24 (1.24) 5.73 (2.28) 
Vomit 9325 1.89 (1.23) 3.22 (1.96) 
Cat 9571 1.96 (1.50) 5.64 (2.50) 
Man on Fire 9635.1 1.90 (1.31) 6.54 (2.27) 
KKK rally 9810 2.09 (1.78) 6.62 (2.26) 
Car Accident 9900 2.46 (1.39) 5.58 (2.13) 
Car Accident 9902 2.33 (1.38) 6.00 (2.15) 
Car Accident 9911 2.30 (1.37) 5.76 (2.10) 
Fire 9921 2.04 (1.47) 6.52 (1.94) 
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APPENDIX I: TABLES 
Table 1. Signal detection analysis for correct items on the grammar test in Experiment 1. 
Condition Hit Rate Miss Rate CR Rate False 
Alarm 
d’ c 
Positive  0.598 0.402 0.615 0.385 0.559 0.025 
Neutral 0.560 0.440 0.566 0.434 0.352 0.042 
Negative 0.688 0.312 0.610 0.390 0.717 -0.055 
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Table 2. Signal detection analysis for consistent items on the grammar test in Experiment 1. 
Condition Hit Rate Miss Rate CR Rate False 
Alarm 
d’ c 
Positive  0.611 0.389 0.615 0.385 0.628 -0.0072 
Neutral 0.607 0.393 0.566 0.434 0.475 -0.020 
Negative 0.634 0.366 0.610 0.390 0.683 -0.036 
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Table 3. Mean and standard deviation PANAS scores for Experiment 2 for pre and post mood 
induction. 
Measure of 
mood 
Mood Condition 
 Positive-HA Positive-LA Neutral Negative 
 Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post 
PANAS positive 31.17 
(7.94) 
20.15 
(8.37) 
30.64 
(7.81) 
23.89 
(10.12) 
32.94 
(7.87) 
19.79 
(8.56) 
32.74 
(7.71) 
21.70 
(8.27) 
PANAS negative  15.17 
(5.16) 
14.85 
(4.78) 
15.11 
(6.98) 
14.00 
(4.46) 
16.26 
(5.84) 
14.02 
(3.65) 
14.19 
(4.28) 
16.11 
(5.65) 
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Table 4. Signal detection analysis for correct items on the grammar test in Experiment 2. 
Condition Hit Rate Miss Rate CR Rate False 
Alarm 
d’ c 
Positive- 
HA 
0.661 0.340 0.618 0.382 0.752 0.033 
Positive- LA 0.658 0.342 0.601 0.399 0.5210 -0.01 
Neutral  0.664 0.336 0.540 0.461 0.460 -0.048 
Negative 0.629 0.371 0.600 0.403 0.614 -0.006 
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Table 5. Signal detection analysis for the consistent items on the grammar test in Experiment 2. 
Condition Hit Rate Miss Rate CR Rate False 
Alarm 
d’ c 
Positive- 
HA 
0.611 0.389 0.618 0.382 0.661 0.062 
Positive- LA 0.667 0.333 0.601 0.411 0.508 0.006 
Neutral  0.620 0.380 0.540 0.461 0.352 0.006 
Negative 0.602 0.399 0.600 0.403 0.527 0.028 
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Table 6. Mean valence and arousal ratings for the images used in Experiment 3. 
Condition Valence M Arousal M 
Positive-HA 6.708 (0.153) 6.196 (0.328) 
Positive-LA 6.640 (0.455) 3.345 (0.333) 
Neutral 4.585 (0.222) 2.335 (0.293) 
Negative 2.131 (0.589) 6.586 (0.868) 
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Table 7. Mean and standard deviation PANAS scores for Experiment 3 for pre and post mood 
induction. 
Measure of 
mood 
Mood Condition 
 Positive-HA Positive-LA Neutral Negative 
 Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post 
PANAS positive 30.84 
(8.10) 
24.56 
(10.18) 
32.46 
(7.24) 
22.92 
(8.71) 
28.20 
(8.90 
18.18 
(8.50) 
30.60 
(7.68) 
19.62 
(7.52) 
PANAS negative  15.12 
(5.23) 
13.82 
(4.80) 
16.76 
(6.33) 
13.58 
(4.80) 
15.68 
(6.13) 
14.86 
(4.68) 
15.52 
(6.18) 
24.16 
(9.66) 
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Table 8. Signal detection analysis for correct items on the grammar test in Experiment 3.  
Condition Hit Rate Miss Rate CR Rate False 
Alarm 
d’ c 
Positive-HA 0.585 0.415 0.481 0.519 0.160 -0.126 
Positive-LA 0.603 0.397 0.511 0.489 0.325 -0.130 
Neutral  0.641 0.359 0.522 0.478 0.440 -0.130 
Negative 0.654 0.346 0.453 0.547 0.265 -0.082 
 
  
114 
 
Table 9. Signal detection analysis for consistent items on the grammar test in Experiment 3. 
Condition Hit Rate Miss Rate CR Rate False 
Alarm 
d’ c 
Positive-HA 0.585 0.415 0.481 0.519 0.152 -0.096 
Positive-LA 0.619 0.381 0.511 0.489 0.362 -0.090 
Neutral  0.605 0.395 0.522 0.478 0.345 -0.097 
Negative 0.667 0.333 0.453 0.547 0.323 -0.099 
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